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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ESSAYS ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONSHIP  
by 
Bimal Soti 
Florida International University, 2015 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Cem Karayalcin, Major Professor 
The aim of this dissertation is to explore a number of issues in intergovernmental fiscal 
relationships in the United States. Three independent essays in the dissertation focus on 
three different issues of interest in public finance: the response of school districts and 
county governments to changes in state government grant allocations; political 
determinants of presidential disaster declarations; and the crowding out of federal 
transfers to states by private charitable donations with special reference to the proportion 
of federal welfare grants to all 50 U.S. states over the period 2005 - 2013.  
Results in the first essay show that decreases in real per capita state grants cause 
statistically significant increases in per capita property taxes in Florida counties and 
school districts. However, the effect is stronger for counties as compared to the school 
districts. Another major result from this study is that property taxes, a major funding 
source for public education, decrease when the proportion of the young in total 
population increases. This could have important consequences for public education 
funding.  
Results from the second essay show that during the sample period, from 2000 to 
2013, the average number of days for presidential disaster declarations was lower when 
vi 
 
the president is a Republican and the governor is a Democrat. The longest time delay in 
presidential disaster declarations occurred when the president is a Democrat and the 
governor is a Republican. The study also provides evidence that the higher the incumbent 
president’s vote share, the shorter is the delay in presidential disaster declarations. 
Additionally, it is found that the more salient the disaster event is (as measured by the 
number of newspaper articles per day), the shorter it takes for presidents to declare major 
disasters.  
The third essay provides evidence that state-level charitable contributions 
correlate significantly with federal public welfare grants to states. An increase in 
charitable contributions leads to a decrease in the proportion of federal grants allocated to 
public welfare, controlling for political and demographic factors. The study also shows 
that the level of crowding out that occurs is significantly higher than that predicted by the 
previous literature on the subject. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
In the United States there are three distinct tiers of government with their own 
distinct set of fiscal responsibilities namely, federal, state, and local governments. States 
typically enjoy a substantial degree of fiscal autonomy and have the authority to collect 
their own taxes and determine their own levels public spending. This fiscal autonomy has 
given the states the ability to respond to local preferences and makes them in return 
highly accountable to local people  (Laubach, 2005).  
Yet, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the states does not mean that they are 
completely fiscally independent of the federal government. First, spending by the federal 
government directly affects state finances. Second, states are subject to a number of 
limitations imposed by the federal constitution, most notably in interstate commerce 
(Laubach, 2005).  Third, state residents pay taxes directly to the federal government and 
receive transfer payments and public services from it.  
For all levels of government, taxes, and most importantly property, sales, and 
income taxes, are a major source of revenue. For the federal government the main sources 
of revenue are individual income taxes, payroll taxes, corporate income taxes, excise 
taxes, estate and gift taxes, customs duties and some miscellaneous receipts. State 
governments generate most of their revenue (other than federal government grants) from 
individual and corporate income taxes, sales and use taxes, and several other minor taxes 
such as inheritance, licenses, and mineral severance taxes. States also receive revenues 
from recreation charges, higher education payments, lotteries, and other service charges. 
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For local governments the major sources of revenue are intergovernmental transfers, 
property taxes, fees and miscellaneous receipts. While never a completely satisfactory 
source, property taxes typically have constituted the major channel through which local 
governments have raised revenue (Oates and Schwab, 2004). 
Intergovernmental revenue transfers are routinely used in the United States to 
transfer funds from one level of government to the other to fund either general 
governmental operations or particular projects. Revenue transfers from the federal to state 
governments and from state to local governments, are important for the provision of 
public goods and services. These transfers affect the lower government’s incentives to 
raise their own revenue to fund projects and, in some cases, revenue transfers from upper 
level governments depend on the revenues available to lower level governments.  
Since state and local governments are in the best position to more efficiently and 
effectively implement programs that require localized knowledge and because benefits 
from those programs may extend beyond their jurisdictions, the federal government 
makes grants to state and local governments. In addition, federal grants are also used to 
redistribute resources among communities and individuals. Furthermore, some federal 
grants to state governments are used to help stabilize the economy or to implement 
policies prioritized by the federal government (CBO, 2013). 
1.2 Significance of the Study 
The assignment of fiscal responsibilities and sources of revenues constitute the 
key issues in intergovernmental fiscal relations. Through decisions on grants-in-aid, 
mandates, preemptions, and policy choices to stimulate activity on the state and local 
levels, the federal government influences the forms of the relationships it has with the 
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state and local governments. These intergovernmental relationships are also influenced 
by the complex political, economic, legal, and administrative frameworks in which they 
have been historically embedded. The three essays in this dissertation examine the fiscal 
interactions between the federal, state, and local governments from multiple perspectives 
in an attempt to fill some of the gaps in the existing economic literature. 
1.3 Dissertation Outline 
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. This first chapter provides a basic 
introduction to the intergovernmental fiscal relationships in the United States. Chapters 2, 
3 and 4 are independent chapters focusing on different aspects of the intergovernmental 
fiscal relationships in the United States. Finally, Chapter 5 presents the major findings of 
the dissertation as developed in the previous three chapters and then concludes the study. 
 In Chapter 2, I test the hypothesis that there exists a statistically significant 
negative relationship between the property tax levies of county governments and school 
districts on the one hand and the state government grants to local government on the 
other. The chapter focuses on the property tax revenues of Florida counties and school 
districts because the property tax, as in elsewhere in the United States, is the single most 
important source of local revenue.  
The third chapter presents an analysis of the political determinants of the time it 
takes to declare a major disaster in the United States, with particular attention paid to the 
political drivers of federal emergency management. In this chapter I examine as to 
whether the amount of time taken to declare a major disaster depends mainly on the 
nature of disaster itself or whether political motivations play a significant role. My results 
show that the average number of days it takes to respond for a Republican president and a 
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Democratic governor combination is significantly lower than for either a Democratic 
president and a Democratic governor combination or a Democratic president and a 
Republican governor combination. Generally Republican presidents declare disasters 
with a shorter delay than Democratic presidents. Additionally, the salience of the disaster 
event as measured by the amount of media coverage is shown to be an important 
determinant of the delays involved in declarations of major disasters by US presidents. 
The research finds that more newspaper articles per day result in significantly shorter 
delays before a declaration. 
In chapter four, I analyze whether federal transfers are negatively correlated with 
charitable giving in the U.S. states. The analysis is carried out with special reference to 
the proportion of federal welfare grants to all 50 U.S. states during 2005-2013. It appears 
that the proportion of federal public welfare grants to state governments is negatively 
correlated with state charitable contributions. This effect is statistically and economically 
significant: a one percent increase in charitable contributions decreases the proportion of 
public welfare grants by the federal government to the state on average by 2.198%.  
Finally chapter five summarizes the major findings of the dissertation developed 
in the previous three chapters. Along with the conclusions, recommendations and 
directions for future research are presented.  
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CHAPTER II 
EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN STATE GOVERNMENT REVENUES (GRANTS) 
ON PROPERTY TAXES IN FLORIDA 
Abstract 
Local governments obtain income from a variety of sources with the share of income 
from each source varying significantly by state. The differences observed are typically 
explained by reference to a number of factors including the policy priorities of state and 
local governments, the types of taxes and fees administered, and the types of resources 
available to state governments. In general, the property tax is the major source of local 
government and school district revenues in the United States. The aim of this study is to 
examine the relationship between per-capita property taxes and state revenue grants in the 
period after 2007 coinciding with the burst of the real estate bubble and its aftermath. 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Apart from some federal and state government grants, local governments in the 
United States collect taxes from a variety of local revenue sources, including individual 
income taxes, general sales taxes, specific excise taxes, fees and charges and local 
property taxes (Alm, Buschman, & Sjoquist, 2011). Among these revenue sources, the 
property tax is one of the major sources of revenue for local governments. In 2010, out of 
a total local government revenue of $1,631 billion (counties, municipalities, school 
districts, and special districts combined), $427 billion or 26.18 % came from property 
taxes. At the same time there was approximately $14.54 billion of property taxes levied 
by state governments (U.S. Census Bureau). Intergovernmental revenue transfers, 
particularly from state governments, constitute another major source of revenue for local 
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governments. In 2010 state government transfers to local governments constituted 
$475.79 billion, 29% of the latter’s total revenue. The share of property taxes and 
transfers from state governments in total revenues of local governments vary significantly 
across U.S. states ranging from 9% of total local revenue in Arkansas to 54% in New 
Hampshire. Likewise, the share of transfers from state governments ranges from 7% of 
total local revenues in Hawaii to 50% in Arkansas. This shows that the state and local 
governments are bound in complex fiscal relationships and that local governments are at 
risk when state governments face large budget shortfalls. Because local governments rely 
heavily on the property taxes and transfers from state governments, when the state grants 
to the local governments decline, local governments and school districts face pressure to 
maintain the quality of public services they provide with less funding. While there are 
some studies indicating that local governments respond by reducing spending and 
increasing local taxes sufficiently to make up for reduced state grants, a study by Dye and 
Reschovsky (2008) showed that local governments had responded mainly by increasing 
local property taxes.  
The fiscal crisis caused by the burst of the real estate bubble in 2008 has impacted 
all levels of government in the United States to some extent. While local governments 
have experienced decreased revenue generation due to the increase in unemployment, the 
decrease in consumer purchasing demand (Muro & Hoene, 2009), and the dramatically 
higher number of foreclosures leading to reduced property tax collection (Miller & Svars, 
2010), means that  they are also affected by fiscal issues at the federal and state levels 
(Wolman & Hincapie, 2014). However, initially during the 2007-09 recession, the 
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American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“the stimulus”) provided fiscal relief 
to state and local governments (Gordon, 2012).  
The State of Florida provides a good example on the role of property taxes in 
maintaining the level of local government spending. In Florida in 2010, 19% of the local 
government revenue came from state government sources and 30% from local property 
taxes. Recent changes in state revenues and property taxes in Florida are illustrated in 
Table 2.1. Property tax as percent of total local revenue increased as the share of revenue 
transfers from the state decreased. In 2010, school districts received 43.7%, counties 
26.4%, cities 12.7% and special districts 17.1 % of total property tax levied. In states like 
Florida, property tax is the financial backbone of local governments and school districts.  
Since the property tax depends on the value of property, property tax as a major 
revenue source for local governments could be under threat during economic downturns. 
However, it should also be noted that the property tax is different from all other taxes as 
the property tax revenue generation is based on the decision of the taxing body, which 
calculates the amount of revenue required to balance its budget (Boris & Steuerle, 2006). 
Because of the importance of state revenue transfers for local government 
functioning and the property taxes being as the most flexible source of revenue at the 
local level, this chapter examines the effect of changes in state government revenue 
transfers to local governments on the levies of property taxes by Florida local 
governments, particularly on counties and school districts.  
While there is abundant literature on how the state and local governments respond 
to increased revenues and their allocation, there exist a rather limited number of studies 
looking into the fiscal responses of state and local governments to reduced grants and 
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revenue collection. Existing studies present mixed results and do not provide a clear 
description of the responses of state and local governments to maintain balanced budgets. 
Following the methodology established by Dye and Reschovsky (2008), this study 
examines the percent change in per-capita property taxes and state revenues and 
especially in the period in which the real estate bubble burst in 2008 and its aftermath. 
Dye and Reschovsky (2008) use state-wide data for property tax collections of local 
governments (combined of counties, cities, school districts and special districts) and state 
aid in 2000, 2002 and 2004. Although they report that the within-state correlation of year-
to-year changes in real per-capita local government property taxes and state aid was 
negative in 24 States during 1978-2000, the substitution between property taxes and state 
aid was insignificantly different from zero for all local governments between 2002 and 
2004. A similar exercise for School Districts found a strongly negative coefficient on the 
state aid variable.  
In this study, I tested the hypothesis that property tax levies by county 
governments and school districts respond negatively to a change in state government 
revenue grants to local governments. I focused on the levies of property taxes by Florida 
counties and school districts because it is the single most important source of local 
revenue.  
2.2 Data and Methodology 
A panel of 67 Florida counties with yearly data for 2006-2010 was used.  A 
separate panel of 67 independent school districts with annual data for 2006-2010 was 
used for a second regression. County revenue data came from the Florida Department of 
Financial Services and the Department of Revenues, and school district revenue data was 
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obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. The population estimates are from the Office of 
Economic and Demographic Research. 
Consideration of two separate panels of data for counties and school districts is 
based on the fact that Florida is one of 41 U.S. states where school districts themselves 
collect local property taxes1. The state constitution of Florida authorizes counties, 
municipalities, and school districts to levy ten mills of property taxes (EDR, 2012). In 
addition to the ten-mill cap, the constitution allows for a voted debt service millage and a 
voted millage not to exceed a period of two years. The state constitution deems school 
districts to be independent from the counties and allows school boards a non-voted 
discretionary school operating millage rate. To have a sense of the range millage across 
school districts over the years note that Glades, the school district with the highest 
average operating millage rate, chose rates of 5.66, 6.74, and 7.24 in 2008, 2009, and 
2010 respectively. The Monroe school district, which had the lowest average operating 
millage rate during this period, imposed rates of 2.45, 2.42, and 2.89 in 2008, 2009, and 
2010 respectively (FDE, 2009, 2010, 2011).
                                                          
1 School districts in the following states do not themselves collect local property taxes: Alaska, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia. 
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Table 2.1 Property tax and state governmental revenue in Florida Local Governments 2004-2010. 
Year Local 
governments 
total revenue 
In billions 
Property 
tax 
as % of 
total 
Local 
revenue 
State 
revenue 
as % of 
total 
Local 
revenue 
Per capita 
property 
tax 
in 2005 
price 
Per capita 
state aid  
in 2005 
price 
Change 
in real 
per 
capita 
property 
tax 
Change in 
real per 
capita 
state aid 
Change in real 
per-capita state 
aid as  
percent of 
property tax 
2004 71.79 25 24 1081.23 1026.12 
   
2005 76.28 26 24 1126.19 1007.40 4.16 -1.82 -1.73 
2006 85.37 27 22 1223.62 995.06 8.65 -1.22 -1.10 
2007 96.65 28 22 1375.31 1105.29 12.40 11.08 9.01 
2008 101.82 30 21 1505.01 1073.99 9.43 -2.83 -2.28 
2009 92.46 32 20 1458.33 924.34 -3.10 -13.93 -9.94 
2010 94.61 30 19 1350.64 874.65 -7.38 -5.38 -3.41 
Source: Annual surveys of State and Local Government Finance data, U.S. Census Bureau 
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Table 2.2 Total revenue of school districts in Florida, 2006-2010. 
Year 
 
Total 
Revenue 
(billions) 
Federal 
grant  
as % of 
Total Rev 
State 
grant  
as % of 
Total Rev 
Property 
Tax as 
% of 
Total 
Rev 
Per capita 
Real 
State Grant 
(in 2005$) 
Per capita 
Real 
Property tax 
(in 2005) 
Change in 
per-capita 
state grant 
as  of  
property 
taxes 
Change in 
per capita 
property 
taxes 
2006 25.42 9.68 40.18 39.27 544.74 532.34 
  
2007 28.90 8.61 40.07 40.90 593.47 605.80 9.15 13.80 
2008 30.00 8.27 39.43 42.34 588.02 631.37 -0.90 4.22 
2009 26.50 10.17 34.15 47.00 442.86 609.52 -22.99 -3.46 
2010 26.23 16.01 31.32 43.97 392.82 551.35 -8.21 -9.54 
Source: Public School Finance Data, U.S. Census Bureau.
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The empirical model hypothesizes that the change in real per capita income in the 
previous year has a positive effect on the change in per capita property tax in the current 
year. As income increases, demand for public goods provided by the local government 
would increase in quantity and to meet this higher demand the government revenue must 
rise. An increase in real per capita income can also lead to a demand for higher quality 
education with the same effect on required government expenditures. 
Similarly, a change in assessed property value is expected to have a positive effect 
on per capita property tax levies in that year. A change in total population the previous 
year will also have effect on per capita property tax in the current year. With an increase 
in total population, producing a given level of public good may require a lower per-capita 
expenditure, which can ultimately result in a lower per capita property tax. I hypothesize 
a negative effect of the proportion of elderly population (65 years and above) on per 
capita property taxes. This is based on the notion that elderly residents prefer a lower 
level of public goods provision and constitute a significant share of the population in 
Florida, where according to U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey, over 
18.2% of Florida’s population was 65 and older in 2012 compared to less than 13.3% for 
the nation.  Considering a potential positive correlation between the share in population 
of those who are 65 years and older and the change in total population, a year-wise 
correlation was run which did not show any significant correlation in any year. A similar 
relationship was seen in the share in population of the 5-18 age group and the change in 
total population.  
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Small counties are another group of interest as counties with small populations are 
mostly rural counties in Florida and tend to have few sources of revenue other than 
assessed property. They are thus in a special situation of over-dependence on property 
taxes and assistance from other counties in the form of shared revenue (Florida 
Association of Counties, 2004). The correlation coefficients between the share of 
property taxes in a county’s own total revenue and the share of the county population in 
the total Florida population are negative but insignificant, yet display an increasing trend 
between 2006 and 2010. As a result, because of the special circumstances faced by the 
small counties, a small county dummy is used for counties when their population is less 
than 75,000.  
Year dummies are included for every year in the data. Each of the years in the 
sample is assumed to affect all the counties and school districts in a similar way. In 2007, 
the legislature stepped up the pressure on local governments by rolling back the property 
tax rate, but allowed county commissions to approve higher rates with a super-majority 
vote. In 2008, voters approved a constitutional amendment to double the homestead 
exemption for homeowners, to create portability for the Save Our Homes (SOH) and to 
put a cap on tax assessments for non-homestead property. A state-wise property tax 
overview presented by Dadayan (2012) shows that Florida experienced the highest drop-
off in both total and per-capita property taxes between 2007 and 2009 of all the U.S. 
states. From 2007 to 2008 total property taxes grew by 12.8 percent (11.9 percent in per 
capita terms), whereas it dropped by 2.5 percent in 2009 (3.1 percent in per capita terms). 
Thus, a total difference of 15.3 percent in property tax (15 percent in per capita terms) 
growth rate occurred between 2007 and 2009.  
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The model for the relationship between the change in county per-capita property 
taxes and the change in per-capita state revenue transfers to counties (along with other 
variables) is given by the equation below: (chngpcptax)it =  β0 +  β1(chngpcstrev)it − 1 +   β2(chngptaxshre)it − 1+  β3(chngrlpcinc)it − 1 +  β4(chngassval)it +  β5(smlcounty)it +  β6(chngtotpop)it − 1 +  β7(shre65yrsabv)it − 1 +  β8(d1)+  β9(d2)  +  εit  
Where (chngpcptax)it  denotes the change in real per-capita property tax in year t, 
(chngpcstrev)it-1 denotes the change in real per-capita state revenue transfers as the 
percentage of property taxes in year t-1, (ptaxshre)it-1 denotes property tax as share of 
total revenue in year t-1, (chngrlpcinc)it-1 stands for the change in per capita real income 
in year t-1, (chngassval)it represents the change in the assessed property value in year t, 
(smlcounty)it:  takes the value 1 if the county population is less than 75,000, otherwise it 
is 0, (chngtotpop)it-1 denotes the change in total population in year t-1, (shre65yrsabv)it-1 
represents the share of 65 years and above in population in year t-1, (d1) and (d2)  are 
year dummies for 2008 and 2009 respectively with 2010 being the reference year.  
The school district model is represented by a similar equation as (2.1) above, 
except that ‘the share of 65 years and above in population in year t-1’ is replaced by 
‘share of 5-18 years in total population’. Accordingly, two separate model coefficients 
are presented in table 2.7. 
Even if data is used for 2006-2010, only a three-year panel is used to run the 
above model as most of the explanatory variables are one year lagged. Thus, the change 
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in real per capita property tax in 2008 is regressed on the change in real per-capita state 
revenue in 2007. Similarly, all other variables except the change in assessed property 
value, and the ‘small county dummy’ are from 2007 in the first year observed, i.e. 2008. 
The values of explanatory variables for 2007 are in turn calculated as a percent change 
compared to 2006 value.   
Table 2.3 in the descriptive statistics shows the values of county level variables, 
which in turn are used to calculate the percentage change over the years shown in Table 
2.5. Revenues listed in Table 2.3 are the amount received exclusively by county 
governments (it does not include the amount levied or received by municipalities, school 
districts, and special districts within that particular county). Similarly, Table 2.4 shows 
the school district revenue and population variables, which are used to calculate the 
percentage change between years shown in Table 2.6.  
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Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics of absolute value of county variables, 2007-2010. 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total revenue (in‘000s) overall 664,452.3 1,416,026 12,944.08 9,683,635 
between  1,421,042 13,752.1 9,367,044 
within  91,971.62 -27,432.16 1,157,669 
Property tax as share 
of total revenue 
overall 26.295 7.939 9.77 52.13 
between  7.616 10.063 47.658 
within  2.385 13.105 35.145 
Real per capita 
property tax 
overall 449.588 201.132 114.21 1,149.78 
between  197.519 127.648 952.043 
within  43.343 274.661 669.811 
Real per capita state 
revenue 
overall 231.992 161.337 74.03 912.9 
between  152.734 83.133 681.13 
within  54.441 -16.093 517.772 
Total Population overall 279,997.7 440,685.9 7,772 2,496,435 
between  443,152 8,128.75 2,477,090 
within  5,185.445 252,423.4 307,098.7 
Population ≥ 65 yrs. overall 48,145.74 68,740.09 907 360,391 
between  69,097.89 929 348,828 
within  2,080.483 37,261.74 59,708.74 
Real per capita income overall 29,753.15 9,300.844 15,969 60,251 
between  9,257.613 16,404.25 55,845.75 
within  1,328.628 25,548.4 34,924.4 
N = 268, n = 67, T = 4  
18 
 
Table 2.4 Descriptive statistics of absolute values of school district variables (2007-
2010). 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total revenue (in 
‘000) 
overall 416,514.3 670,832.8 11,183 3,959,408 
between  672,994.6 11,586.5 3,687,021 
within  46,733.08 172,210.3 688,901.3 
Share of property 
tax in total revenue 
overall 36.649 17.388 6.47 71.32 
between  17.252 7.95 69.983 
within  2.833 21.656 45.036 
Real per capita state 
revenue 
overall 603.724 297.995 102.96 2,615.16 
between  267.743 190.198 1,561.87 
within  133.866 -32.166 1,657.014 
Real per capita 
property tax 
overall 492.370 246.835 90.9 1,188.83 
between  245.49 101.143 1,095.958 
within  36.596 339.988 623.255 
5-18 yrs. population overall 48,485.650 80,172.810 1,254 460,401 
between  80,599.77 1,306 452,798 
within  2,085.526 26,733.650 56,088.65 
Total population overall 279,997.7 440,685.9 7,772 2,496,435 
between  443,152 8,128.75 2,477,090 
within  5,185.445 252,423.4 307,098.7 
Real per capita 
income 
overall 29,753.15 9,300.844 15,969 60,251 
between  9,257.613 16,404.25 55,845.75 
within  1,328.628 25,548.4 34,924.4 
N = 268, n = 67, T = 4 
 
2.3 Results and Discussion 
Revenue sources for state governments such as the individual income tax and the 
sales tax are more sensitive to economic downturns than the property tax, the main source 
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of local government revenue (Reschovsky, 2003). The descriptive statistics in Table 2.5 
indicate an overall reduction in real per-capita property tax in Florida counties during 
2008-2010 by -4.688%. While there is a possibility that the reduced rate of property tax 
could be due to reduced rental income or lower property values, the results indicate that 
the share of state grants in total revenue also plays a role in the reduction of property tax 
rates (Table 2.7). However, in their analysis of historical data and case studies in 
individual states, Lutz et al. (2011) reported that the property tax revenue collected by 
local governments remained resilient after recessions. This resilience could be the result 
of significant lags in the effect of changes in property market values on changes in 
taxable assessments, and may in part be due to the tendency of local policymakers to 
offset declines in property values by increasing the property tax rate (Lutz et al., 2011; 
Jonas, 2012). The average change in real per-capita state revenue transfers to counties 
during 2007-2009 is also negative, but this rate is smaller than the change in property 
taxes. As the rate of change in per-capita state revenue transfers is calculated with respect 
to the per-capita property tax (in the denominator), even a small change in state revenues 
results in a large rate of change (for example Min: -102.73 and Max: 146.76, Table 2.5) if 
the county collects a small amount of per-capita property taxes compared to per-capita 
state transfers. As expected, the share of property taxes in total revenues is highly 
significant in both regressions. Results in Table 2.7 show coefficients of -0.207 and 
-0.184 for counties and school districts respectively (p<0.01 in both models).  A one 
percent increase in the share of property taxes in overall revenues the previous year leads 
to a reduction in per-capita property taxes by $0.20 and $0.18 in counties and school 
districts. Thus, a local government that was highly dependent on property taxes as a 
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source of revenue the previous year is likely to lower the per-capita property tax the 
following year. This effect could be due to the adjustment by policymakers and tax 
administrators at the level of local government to maintain a balance among revenue 
sources. That is, if local policymakers believe that the local government has become too 
dependent on a specific source of revenue, they would want to reduce the excess 
dependency on that specific source by trying to raise more revenue from other sources. 
Though not statistically significant, the results of this study complement the 
general perception that the aging population has an overall negative impact on public 
spending (Harris et al., 2001). The share of those 65 years or older in the total population 
shows an inverse relationship with the change in per-capita county property tax. With the 
increase in the share of the aging population, Florida counties on average tend to reduce 
per-capita property taxes ceteris paribus, possibly due to the preference structure of this 
population group. On the other hand, parents of school-aged children are thought to 
prefer higher levels of local spending on schools (thus higher property taxes). However, 
the population share of those aged 5-18 shows an unexpectedly strong inverse 
relationship with the school district property tax. This result may be due to the relatively 
high level of non-whites in the school-age population (Porteba, 1996). Although county-
wise ethnic composition was not considered in the model, the result obtained is similar to 
what Alesina et al. (1999) found, that is that voters tend to choose lower levels of public 
goods when the tax burden falls largely on one ethnic group, while the benefits from the 
public good thus financed are shared broadly with other ethnic groups. It is, however, 
worth noting that using data on American cities and school districts, Lee et al. (2015) 
21 
 
found evidence that ethnic heterogeneity results in reallocation of local public spending 
across uses rather than reducing it.  
Table 2.5 Descriptive statistics of percent change in model variables in counties (2008-
2010). 
Variable   Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max   
Change in real per capita 
property tax 
overall -4.688 6.411 -24.020 19.320  
between  4.447 -15.127 5.083  
within  4.639 -17.035 9.855  
Change in real per capita 
state revenue as percent of 
property tax 
overall -1.506 27.338 -102.730 146.760  
between  14.001 -43.877 49.050  
within  23.523 -119.706 102.747  
Property tax as share of 
total revenue 
overall 26.216 7.711 9.770 47.130  
between  7.475 10.157 46.167  
within  2.034 15.976 32.546  
Share of 65 yrs and above in 
total population 
overall 18.158 8.460 4.160 66.03  
between  8.498 4.293 64.727  
within  0.272 17.281 19.461  
Rate of change in total 
population 
overall 1.211 1.640 -3.680 8.680  
between  0.938 -1.050 4.923  
within  1.348 -2.523 4.967  
Change in real per capita 
income 
overall -1.416 3.257 -15.690 12.150  
between  1.650 -5.783 4.233  
within  2.813 -11.489 6.501  
Change in assessed property 
value 
overall -3.484 12.741 -25.330 94.940  
between  8.576 -16.383 31.097  
within  9.462 -37.364 60.359  
Small county with pop. 
<75,000 
overall 0.453 0.499 0.000 1.000  
between  0.498 0.000 1.000  
within   0.058 0.119 1.119   
Observations: N= 201, n= 67, T =3 
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Table 2.6 Descriptive statistics of change in model variables in school districts (2008-
2010). 
 
Variable  Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Change in real per capita 
property tax 
overall -0.316 8.771 -18.850 50.270 
between  4.831 -9.480 13.933 
within  7.337 -21.669 36.021 
Change in real per capita 
state revenue as percent of 
property tax 
overall -1.328 55.620 -176.460 539.120 
between  32.111 -43.503 243.830 
within  45.528 -172.232 293.962 
Property tax as share of 
total revenue 
overall 36.267 17.368 6.470 71.320 
between  17.218 7.670 69.633 
within  2.858 22.743 45.613 
Share of  5-18 yrs. in total 
population 
overall 16.759 2.232 11.4 22.05 
between  2.233 11.503 21.923 
within  0.212 16.222 17.492 
Change in total population overall 1.211 1.640 -3.680 8.680 
between  0.938 -1.050 4.923 
within  1.348 -2.523 4.967 
Change in real per capita 
income 
overall -1.416 3.257 -15.690 12.150 
between  1.650 -5.783 4.233 
within  2.813 -11.489 6.501 
Change in assessed 
property value 
overall -3.484 12.741 -25.330 94.940 
between  8.576 -16.383 31.097 
within  9.462 -37.364 60.359 
Observations: N= 201, n= 67, T =3 
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Table 2.7 Regression estimates of changes in real per capita property taxes in county and 
school district (2008- 2010). 
Variables County School District 
Change in real per capita state revenue as 
percent of property taxes 
-0.028* 
(-1.8) 
-0.022** 
(-1.97) 
Property tax as share of total revenue -0.207*** 
(-3.26) 
-0.184*** 
 (-4.31) 
Change in real per capita income 0.063 
(0.35) 
-0.120 
 (-0.53) 
Change in assessed property value -0.027 
(-0.65) 
0.052 
 (0.91) 
Small county (pop<75,000) 1.774* 
(1.78) 
 
Change in total population 0.387 
(1.22) 
0.946** 
 (2.46) 
Share of 65 yrs and above in total 
population 
-0.067 
(-1.21) 
 
Share of 5-18 yrs. in total population  -0.723** 
 (-2.55) 
2008 -0.475 
(-0.29) 
7.696*** 
 (3.69) 
2009 -1.186 
(-0.88) 
1.269 
 (0.72) 
Constant 1.186  
(0.53) 
14.333** 
 (2.5) 
No. of observations: 201  
^Output in this table is obtained by running a Time Fixed Effect panel regression in 
STATA. 
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10% 
Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics.  
 
The main results of this study are presented in Table 2.7, where two separate 
regressions for county and school districts are shown. As expected, real per-capita state 
revenue transfers are shown to be negatively correlated with per-capita property taxes in 
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both county as well as school district regressions. However, a stronger effect is visible in 
the school district as compared to county regressions. Although the magnitude of the 
regression coefficient on the change in local governments own source revenue is small, it 
has the negative sign as expected. A one percent increase in per-capita state revenues (as 
a percentage of property taxes) at the county level on average leads to a decrease in per 
capita county property tax by $0.028 (about 3 cents) (p=0.10). Similarly a one percent 
increase in per-capita state revenues at school-district level on average leads to a decrease 
in per-capita school district property taxes by $0.022 (about 2 cents).  Past researchers 
have presented mixed results in terms of the response of local governments to cuts in 
federal aid (Gamkhar, 2002; Reschovsky, 2003). While some suggest that state and local 
governments respond symmetrically to increases and decreases in grants, others suggest 
that they respond to grant cuts by raising taxes to make up for lost revenue. The results 
presented here support the idea that local governments respond by raising the property 
tax to make up for the lost grant funds.(source?) 
 Contrary to the priors, the research shows that the association between real per-
capita income and per-capita property taxes is insignificant in both county and school 
district regressions. The assessed property value, as a control variable in the model, was 
expected to have a positive relationship with the change in real per-capita property taxes. 
The expected result was obtained in the school district regression, but the opposite in the 
county regressions. However, both coefficients are statistically insignificant, indicating 
that there may not be a correlation between assessed property values and property taxes.   
Small counties are associated, as expected, with a statistically significant increase 
in per-capita property taxes. Other things being equal, counties that have populations of 
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less than 75,000 are associated with a $1.77 increase in the per-capita property tax 
(p<0.10). Similarly, a one percent increase in the population on average leads to a $0.95 
increase in the school district per-capita property tax (p<0.05). Population changes also 
positively affect the property taxes in counties, though the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. These positive associations between the total population and property taxes 
run counter to the notion that public service provision is subject to increasing returns to 
scale so that the per-capita cost of public services decline as population increases. 
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CHAPTER III 
FEDERAL DISASTER DECLARATIONS: IMPACT OF ELECTORAL 
INCENTIVES ON PRESIDENTIAL DISASTER DECLARATION DELAY 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the determinants of the time it takes for policymakers 
to declare a major disaster, with particular attention paid to the political determinants of 
federal emergency management. The paper tests whether the time taken to declare a 
major disaster depends on the nature of disaster itself or on the political motives of 
policymakers. I analyze 797 disaster declarations between 2000 and 2013 covering two 
full tenures of a Republican president and one full plus two years tenure of two 
Democratic presidents. My results show that the average days it takes to declare a major 
disaster for the combination of a Republican president and a Democratic governor is 
significantly shorter than both the Democratic president-cum-Democratic governor and 
Democratic president-cum-Republican governor combinations. Similarly, the pair of 
Republican president-cum-Republican governor takes significantly shorter to declare a 
major disaster than the pair of Democratic president-cum-Republican governor. Thus, the 
evidence here suggests that generally republican presidents declare disasters faster than 
Democratic presidents. Additionally, the salience of the disaster events as measured by 
the media coverage is shown to be negatively correlated with delays in the declaration of 
major disasters. Here it is found that more newspaper articles per day covering a disaster 
lead to shorter delays in presidential declarations. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Local and state governments have the first responsibility for protecting their 
citizens before disasters and providing recovery assistance after disasters. However, when 
a disaster is too large for the state and local governments to deal with, they seek help 
from the federal government.  The President can issue a major disaster or emergency 
declaration in response to catastrophes that overwhelm state and local governments under 
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act  (1988), known as 
the Stafford Act.  The disaster declaration process is initiated by a request from the 
governor of the state. With guidance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) officials, the president decides whether to grant or deny the request. The federal 
government typically provides disaster related assistance to states and lower level 
governments in all four stages of disaster management, that is, preparedness, response, 
recovery, and mitigation. The Disaster Relief Act of 1950 formalized the role of the 
federal government in disaster assistance. The federal government has over time placed 
increasing emphasis on disaster mitigation, especially after the restructuring of FEMA in 
1993 when a mitigation directorate was created (Platt, 1999). Over the years, mitigation 
and private insurance have remained important agenda items for the federal government. 
However, it is clear that the role of the federal government has remained crucial also in 
the aftermath of the disaster when the state and local governments do not have the means 
to deal effectively with the challenges created by the disaster. The federal response may 
take the form of an emergency declaration (special emergency), fire management, or a 
major disaster declaration. Major presidential disaster declarations, constituting a type of 
assistance that is influenced by many political factors, is the main focus of this paper.  
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An immediate response to a disaster by the federal government is typically 
assumed to be the standard response, but depending on the nature of the disaster and a 
number of political considerations, the response by the federal government is most 
usually delayed. The time it takes to declare a major disaster in turn has a long-term 
effect on the affected states and counties and can cause major delays in the completion of 
recovery works.  Many factors other than type, intensity, and coverage of disasters affect 
the initiation of post-disaster work.  This paper explores the determinants of the time it 
takes to declare a major disaster, paying particular attention to the political factors that 
influence federal emergency management. In particular, I try to examine the relative role 
played by the nature of the disaster itself as compared to the political factors that affect 
the time it takes to declare a major disaster.  
Most of the literature on major disaster declarations is focused on examining the 
factors affecting presidential disaster declarations and the level of federal disaster 
expenditure either before disasters for preparation or mitigation or in the aftermath of 
disasters for recovery (Chen, 2012; Gasper & Reeves, 2011; Sobel et al., 2007; Sainz-
Santamaria & Anderson, 2013). There are only a small number of studies examining the 
determinants of the time taken to declare major disasters. Yet, as the time taken to declare 
disasters constitutes a part of a longer process of disaster declaration and the allocation of 
disaster expenditures, existing research on the subject does provide a helpful 
steppingstone for the analysis that follows. The investigation in this paper is based on the 
premise that the same set of variables that help explain the level of resources allocated to 
deal with the aftermath of a disaster will also be relevant to  the determinants of the time 
it takes to declare a major disaster.  
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The literature that analyzes the effect of political factors on the time it takes to 
declare a major disaster is small. Langabeer, Delli and Alqusairi, (2012) examine the 
1993-2005 data for major disaster declarations with a focus on the effect of president-
governor party affiliations on the time delays for the decision to declare major disasters. 
In this paper, the major departure from the approach adopted by Langabeer et al. is the 
incorporation of evidence on the importance of disaster events as measured by media 
coverage so as to assess the political incentives faced by presidents when deciding 
whether or not to declare a major disaster.  
3.1.1 Disaster declarations and Role of President and FEMA 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) coordinates the federal 
government's role in preparing for, preventing, mitigating the effects of, responding to, 
and recovering from all domestic disasters, whether natural or man-made, including acts 
of terror. The activities of FEMA are guided by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 
and Emergency Assistance Act, which amended the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 and was 
signed into law on November 23, 1988. According to the provisions of this statute, a  
U.S. presidential disaster declaration of emergency triggers financial and physical 
assistance through FEMA. It is the role of FEMA to identify the specific counties within 
a state that will be eligible for federal assistance once a state is declared to be the site of a 
major disaster by the president. The decision as to which counties within a state will 
receive a declaration and subsequent assistance is based in part on the result of 
preliminary damage assessments and in part on politics and media attention (Platt, 1999). 
There are three types of disaster declarations that are under the purview of FEMA. While 
fire management and emergency declaration (special emergency) are dealt by FEMA, the 
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proposal for major, also called presidential, disaster declarations are issued by the 
president. Two major components of major disaster declarations are public assistance 
(PA) and individual assistance (IA). The PA is primarily for the repair and/or 
replacement of public infrastructure if to do so is beyond the capacity of state and local 
government. Up to 75% of expenses to repair or replace public infrastructure are covered 
by federal assistance. Individual assistance on the other hand, targets low-income 
individuals and families in the affected counties of a state. In addition, funds for 
Supplemental Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) are 
appropriated by the U.S. Congress to assist communities to recover from major disasters, 
such as hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, and tornadoes. It is important to note that the role 
of the U.S. Congress is to provide funds for supplemental appropriations; it is not directly 
involved in the disaster declaration process itself.  
Although the federal government, through FEMA, has put much of its focus on 
the mitigation of disasters, it is also involved in the other phases of disaster management. 
These are preparedness, response, and recovery. FEMA’s emphasis, as articulated in 
recent legislation and organizational changes, has shifted from response and recovery to 
mitigation. These changes are in line with Peterson’s (1995) functional classification of 
different level of governments with respect to their emergency management functions. 
According to this classification, local governments are in a better position to carryout 
response and recovery tasks, with coordinating assistance from the states and fiscal 
assistance from the federal government. The federal government can be most effective if 
focused on mitigation, which requires investment on research and development, and 
dissemination and availability of technical expertise. Despite these widely accepted roles 
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for different levels of government, the federal involvement in response and recovery is 
driven by a mix of incentives. In the case of some disasters these incentives and other 
pressures may be overwhelming in terms of their magnitude and the capacity of affected 
states or counties, so as to lead to a larger federal response and involvement.  
3.1.2 Political incentives and other factors affecting disaster decisions 
Following the merger of FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
in 2003, the president and the congressional oversight committee still remain as the two 
main avenues of political influence on the operations of FEMA within the DHS. While 
this reorganization reduced the influence of congressional politics on the distribution of 
FEMA funding, the president still is the main actor in the declaration process (Berry, 
Burden, & Howell, 2010), and the decision to grant or deny the assistance is his alone. 
Furthermore, because there is no required threshold of damage that must be sustained in 
the affected area in order to issue a declaration under the Stafford Act, the president 
wields autonomous leverage to approve or to turn down requests. The decision to declare 
a major disaster could be electorally beneficial to the president and the governor of the 
state involved (Gasper & Reeves, 2011). The literature on the subject has argued that the 
majority of the disaster relief provided is politically motivated rather than being based on 
need (Garrett & Sobel, 2003), and that presidents are sensitive to electoral concerns when 
granting aid (Reeves 2011; Garrett & Sobel, 2003; Gasper, 2014). Additionally, political 
incentives for a president are heightened during election years and the likelihood of a 
disaster declaration for a state is a function of electoral timing (Sylves & Buzas, 2007; 
Salkowe & Chakraborty, 2009; Gasper, 2014). Furthermore electoral incentives are 
important factors not only in disaster declarations and allocation of relief spending, but 
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also in funding for disaster preparedness. Sainz-Santamaria and Anderson (2013) have 
examined U.S. disaster preparedness spending data from 1985 to 2008 to see whether 
preparedness is driven by the social planner’s conception of need or by the politicians’ 
desire for reelection. They found that counties that are competitive for the party of the 
incumbent president are allocated disproportionately higher preparedness spending. 
There are several studies that empirically support the theories that swing voters 
and supporters in previous elections are favored by presidents in terms of the allocation 
of federal funds (Garrett & Sobel, 2003; Larcinese, Rizzo & Testa, 2006). In the 
following analysis, it is assumed that factors influencing the allocation of federal disaster 
funds are also relevant to the number of days taken to declare disaster. Thus, the variables 
“political competitiveness” and the “incumbent party share of vote” will play important 
roles in testing the hypothesis that presidents have the incentive to attract swing voters 
and reward supporters from the previous election. Favorable treatment received by the 
state governor of the same political party as the president could also be an example of 
rewarding the supporters as reported by various researchers.  
The congressional dominance model has been used by researchers to analyze the 
role of the congress in federal government disaster decisions, mainly focusing on the 
allocation of disaster expenditure rather than on the presidential declaration itself. 
Evidence suggests that representation of a given state’s member of congress on FEMA 
oversight committees and subcommittees has a significant effect on the level of FEMA 
disaster expenditure for that state (Husted & Nickerson, 2014; Garrett & Sobel, 2003).  
There are recent studies that suggest that the recent changes in the organization of FEMA 
have resulted in the weakening of the link between the level of disaster expenditure in a 
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given state and the congressional representation of that state on FEMA oversight 
committees (Sobel et al. 2007). However, some studies (e.g. Sainz‐Santamaria & 
Anderson, 2013) found that congressional representation on FEMA oversight committees 
still positively affects disaster spending. Further, Sobel et al. (2007) provided evidence 
that politically important states, as measured by share of the vote for the incumbent 
president in that state, continued to have higher rates of disaster declaration. The 
empirical section below includes representation in FEMA oversight committees as an 
explanatory variable to assess whether this has an indirect effect on the president’s 
disaster declaration decisions.  
The literature has considered the effects of media coverage on the decisions 
concerning disaster assistance. Drury et al., (2005) in studying the factors affecting the 
U.S. foreign disaster assistance hypothesized the effects of U.S. foreign and domestic 
political concerns. They used media attention received by a disaster to gauge the salience 
of the event and found that “the number of stories in the New York Times taps the 
salience of the disaster and the country affected” (p.467). This result on the effect of the 
salience of the event as measured by media attention is statistically significant but 
substantively marginal. Eisensee and Stromberg (2007) found similar results when they 
studied the influence of the mass media on the U.S. government’s response to natural 
disasters abroad. The empirical study that follows differs from this literature in that it 
uses the salience of the disaster event in the U.S. context.  
The empirical model in this chapter uses the number of days it takes for the 
president to declare a major disaster as the explanandum. Under the assumptions that 
politicians respond to incentives and seek to maximize votes, the model posits that the 
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salience of the disaster event as proxied by the intensity of its media coverage would be 
negatively correlated with the days taken for the disaster declaration. In addition to 
salience reflected by media coverage, the number of affected counties is posited to be a 
measure of the salience of the event.  
Another factor to be considered is the possible effects of the reorganization of 
FEMA in 2003. The immediate cause of this reorganization was the 9/11 terrorist attack 
on the World Trade Center and Pentagon after which the White House and the U.S. 
Congress acted to make the government agencies more efficient and responsive to help 
prevent future terrorist attacks. Yet the reorganization also changed the way FEMA 
responds to natural disasters. Sobel et al. (2007) used panel data on presidential disaster 
declarations and FEMA disaster expenditures in the U.S. states for 2003-2005 and found 
that the reorganization of FEMA has resulted in a regime change with regard to how 
decisions are made and how it responds to disasters. Because it is necessary to account 
for this regime change in the empirical model a dummy variable is included which takes 
different values before and after the 2003 reorganization. It is a priori not clear how the 
reorganization may have affected the response of FEMA to disasters. Because it faces 
less political pressure from the Congress, it may be that the bureaucratic machinery of 
FEMA has become more efficient. Alternatively less congressional oversight may have 
led to a loss of efficiency.  
3.2 Data and Method 
 
This paper covers the period 2000 to 2013 and thus the tenures of a Republican 
President (2001-2008) and two Democratic Presidents (2000, and 2009-2013). Only 
disaster declarations for the 50 states in this period are considered. Between 2000 and 
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2013, a total of 797 disasters were declared major disasters in the 50 U.S. states. Four 
disasters, which were categorized as incident type ‘other-2’, dam/levee break, and 
terrorist, were removed  leaving 793 presidential disaster declarations that fall into 12 
different incident types: hurricane, flood, tornado, mud/landslide, tsunami waves, severe 
storm, severe ice storm, coastal storm, freezing, snow, earthquake, and fire. These 12 
incident types were aggregated into five main types based on their nature (duration and 
intensity) to avoid statistical biases that would result from creating dummy variables with 
unusually large and small observations. This is because groups with very different sample 
sizes can invalidate the assumption concerning variance homogeneity and the power of 
the tests conducted was based on the smallest sample size. The final dataset groups 
consisted of three atmospheric events, namely, hurricanes, floods/tornadoes, and severe 
storms and two other types, namely earthquakes and fires. In the empirical section below, 
the focus is on a subset of disasters with only atmospheric events by removing the groups 
earthquakes and fires.   
In the dataset there are five instances of disaster declarations when state governors 
were political independents, that is, neither democratic nor republican. Two of these 
disasters occurred under democratic presidents and three under the republican president. 
As the number of observations with independent governors is very small these are 
removed from the data set.  Consequently, the total number of disaster declarations that 
are in the analysis is 788. 
An important variable affecting presidential decisions concerning disaster 
declarations is the political importance of the state. In considering this variable previous 
researchers had initially used the expected number of the state’s electoral votes following 
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Willet (1989) and Tabellini and Alesina (1990).  More recently, Garrett and Sobel (2003) 
have devised an improved measure called electoral importance, which is calculated by 
multiplying each state’s electoral votes by an index that measures the long-term political 
closeness (competitiveness) of each state in presidential elections since 1956.  The 
proportion of a win closer to 0.5 implies that the closeness index is high.  The study uses 
a slight variation that utilizes the formula Yit = 1-4 (Xit-0.5)2 where Xit for state i denotes 
the  percentage of votes the president has received in that state between 1956 and year t, 
with t being the election years 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012. Thus, the electoral 
importance variable obtained by multiplying electoral votes in a state (which may change 
in every election year based on changes in population) by the factor Yit will be a unique 
number for a given state in a four-year period. As an example, the dependent variable in 
the empirical model, “days to declare disaster” between January and December of 2000 is 
expected to be affected by the electoral importance variable derived for the election year 
1996. The Democratic presidential candidates won 3 elections in Alabama between 1956 
and 1996, which implies Xit =0.27. Consequently, the “competitiveness factor” Yit, 
becomes 0.79 and electoral votes of 9 in Alabama in 1996 will result in an electoral 
competitiveness measure of 7.14 for Alabama for the 1997-2000 period.   
The share of votes for the incumbent party in each state in recent elections is used 
to measure political closeness of the incumbent party towards that state. It is expected 
that the president will be more responsive to a state that has supported his party.  
Election year dummies capture the effect of being in an election year. The 
comparison years or omitted years are all other years. In a separate model, a dummy 
variable is created for re-election years, with non-reelection years being the omitted 
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category. In both cases, it is expected that the election-year dummies have a higher and 
more significant effect on the dependent variable, that is, a shorter delay is expected in 
the declaration of major disasters. 
The number of fatalities and injuries and total economic damage (property 
damage and cross loss) due to the disaster provide important information on the 
seriousness of a disaster event, but this information was not included in the present study 
because of the lack of availability of a complete data set2. Durations of the disasters are 
included in the model as a measure of the strength of event given that it was not possible 
to incorporate the physical and human loss data. However, it is acknowledged that the 
duration of a disaster may not truly represent the intensity of the disaster and its use here 
simply reflects the paucity of available data. It is certainly conceivable that the longer the 
disaster lasts, the more likely it is to result in a presidential disaster declaration. However, 
if the extent of the loss is not immediately visible, the presidential declaration may be 
delayed.  
While there is disagreement in the literature on which congressional committees 
and subcommittees have real or influential oversight responsibilities, the study followed 
Garrett & Sobel’s (2003) choices on committee assignments. In addition, the study 
                                                          
2 Some researchers (Sainz-Santamaria and Anderson, 2013) have used county-wise annual and monthly 
aggregate disaster loss data compiled by Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States 
(SHELDUS), University of South Carolina using data from National Climatic Data Center (NCDC.gov), 
the National Geophysical Data Center, and the Storm Prediction Center. However, disaster loss data for 
individual events was impossible to obtain, as there can be more than one disaster event in a county in a 
given month.  Further, many of the events that received presidential disaster declarations and are included 
in FEMA database, the main data source for this paper, are absent from the National Climatic Data Center 
database. In addition, only less than one third of the events listed in the NCDC, the only source of disaster 
loss information, have disaster loss data. Consequently, the limited disaster loss information available was 
not included.   
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focused on the Oversight Committee on Homeland Security that was formed in the 107th 
Congress. Committee membership from all 50 states during each congress from the 106th 
congress to 113th Congress was retrieved from the U.S. Government Publishing Office 
(http://www.gpo.gov/). 
The number of New York Times articles covering each event are used to measure 
the salience of the disaster events. To maintain uniformity throughout the sample, the 
only articles included were those that appeared from the “event beginning date” to 
“disaster declaration date.” Events covered in blogposts, and other multimedia outlets 
were not counted. The name of the state and the incident type are used to search for 
articles in the New York Times index with a specific date search. Titles of the returned 
articles and the first 2-3 lines are scanned to make sure that the articles are about disaster 
events. When there are events such as storms, floods, and fires, extra care was given to 
make sure that they were not used in different contexts. The New York Times was used 
because it is the leading news source in the United States.  Moreover, Van Belle (2003) 
found that both the New York Times coverage and network television news coverage 
“can be used reasonably as indicators of news media salience as an influence on 
bureaucracies, especially on U.S. foreign aid allocations decisions” (p.263). 
3.3 Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics in Table 3.1 show that a disaster took on average 33 days to 
get a major (presidential) disaster declaration.  While the longest delay in disaster 
declarations was for a 2011 severe storm in Vermont taking 172 days, more than half of 
the disasters that presidents declared as major disasters had delays of less than 30 days.  
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics (2000-2013). 
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Days taken to declare major disaster 32.949 25.297 0.438 172.458 
Incumbent President Vote share 51.314 8.637 32.366 71.846 
Electoral Importance 9.110 9.550 0.747 54.756 
President Democrat 0.470 0.499 0 1 
Governor from Democratic party 0.470 0.500 0 1 
FEMA oversight congressional 
subcommittee members 3.690 2.988 0 19 
Same party president and governor 0.504 0.500 0 1 
FEMA reorganization(post 2003) 0.850 0.360 0 1 
Election Years 
    2000_elect 0.040 0.200 0 1
2004_elect 0.070 0.261 0 1 
2008_elect 0.090 0.281 0 1 
2012_elect 0.040 0.206 0 1 
President-Governor 
    Democratic-Democratic 0.222 0.416 0 1
Republican-Republican 0.282 0.450 0 1 
Democratic-Republican 0.244 0.430 0 1 
Republican-Democratic 0.253 0.435 0 1 
Number of NY Times Articles 4.080 8.903 0 120 
Percentage of counties declared 30.052 26.790 0.394 100 
How Long the Incident Lasted 17.582 25.570 0 168.763 
Real GDP Per capita ($2009) 45093.200 8247.226 29063.00 72281 
Incident Type 
    Hurricanes 0.096 0.295 0 1
Flood/Tornado 0.591 0.492 0 1 
Severe Storm 0.274 0.446 0 1 
Earthquake 0.010 0.100 0 1 
Fire 0.028 0.165 0 1 
Valid N (list wise)= 788         
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Table 3.2 OLS Regressions: determinants of days taken to declare major disasters 
Independent Variables Model I Std. Error Model II Std. Error 
(Constant) 104.43 (28.88) 92.25 (28.59) 
Incumbent President Vote Share -3.72** (1.11) -2.86* (1.1) 
Incumbent President Vote share squared 0.04** (0.01) 0.03* (0.01) 
Electoral Importance -0.27 (0.11) -0.44** (0.11) 
Same party President and Governor 0.72 (1.74) 0.78 (1.72) 
President reelection year -5.01 (2.63) -  
2000 election Year   -10.90* (4.36) 
2004 election year   -8.44** (3.23) 
2008 election year   -7.81** (2.94) 
2012 election year   -1.8 (4.12) 
Number of NY Times Article   0.55** (0.1) 
Number of NY Times Article per day -4.07** (0.91) -  
State Real GDP Per capita 0.00** (0) 0.00** (0) 
Duration of incident (days) 0.29** (0.04) 0.29** (0.04) 
Percentage of counties affected and 
declared 
-0.08* (0.04) -0.10** (0.04) 
Hurricane -12.26** (3.56) -4.20** (3.29) 
Flood or Tornado -3.24 (1.96) -2.19 (1.95) 
Number of observations: 758 Adj R2: 0.195 Adj R2: 0.204 
** p<0.01; *p<0.05 
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Table 3.3 OLS Regressions: determinants of days taken to declare major disasters 
Independent Variables Model III Std. Error Model  IV Std. Error Model V Std. Error 
(Constant) 73.52 (28.64) 93.5 (27.94) 90.24 (28.64) 
Incumbent President Vote Share -2.85** (1.09) -3.14** (1.08) -3.30** (1.09) 
Incumbent President Vote share squared 0.03** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 
Electoral Importance -0.23* (0.10) -0.21* (0.10) -0.18 (0.16) 
President Reelection year -3.74 (2.58) -3.82 (2.59) -6.93** (2.62) 
NY Times Per Day Coverage -4.27** (0.89) -4.25** (0.89) -4.22** (0.90) 
Republican President   -9.77** (1.72)   
President - Governor Party (reference group: Rep – Dem)       
        Dem -  Dem 10.36** (2.43)     
        Rep - Rep 4.76* (2.29)     
        Dem - Rep 14.20** (2.43)     
FEMA Reorganization in 2003     11.33** (3.83) 
FEMA oversight subcommittee membership     -0.41 (0.94) 
Reorganization and subcommittee membership interaction     0.26 (0.93) 
State Real GDP Per capita 0.00** (0.00) 0.00** (0.00) 0.00** (0.00) 
Duration of incident (days) 0.28** (0.04) 0.29** (0.04) 0.30** (0.04) 
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Percentage of counties affected and declared -0.07 (0.04) -0.08* (0.04) -0.09* (0.04) 
Hurricane -12.39** (3.48) -11.92** (3.49) -13.34** (3.54) 
Flood or Tornado -2.29 (1.92) -2.74 (1.92) -4.18* (1.95) 
Number of observations: 758    
 ** p<0.01; *p<0.05 
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Regression Results 
The regression results in model (II) indicate that media attention as represented by 
number of New York Times articles did not have the expected effect of reducing the 
delay in presidential disaster declarations. This is a surprising result especially in light of 
the findings in previous literature with regard to the effect of media coverage on disaster 
assistance decisions. To check robustness, random events were selected with more than 
30-days delays in declaration and found that there does not exist a significant difference 
in terms of the number of news articles published with the longer time period. A separate 
specification in model (I) provides evidence for the expected opposite effect for the 
number of articles per day. The negative coefficient is also statistically significant at the 
0.01 level.  
The negative coefficient on the Republican president dummy variable in model 
(IV) provides evidence that Republican presidents are more likely to declare a disaster 
with shorter delay than Democratic presidents, a result that runs counter to those obtained 
in the literature, which has found evidence that Democratic presidents award more 
disaster declarations with shorter delays (Husted & Nickerson, 2014; Langabeer et al., 
2012).  
There is theoretical literature that predicts that political actors (presidents in this 
paper) would redistribute funds to marginal and swing states in order to maximize their 
chance of winning elections (Lindbeck & Weibull, 1987, 1993). Another strand of the 
literature (Cog & McCubbins, 1986) argues that ideological considerations would induce 
policymakers to allocate more funds to those districts where they enjoy more support. To 
test the latter argument, the current chapter hypothesizes that presidents would respond 
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faster in declaring major disasters if the disasters in question occurred in states that have 
higher proportions of voters who voted for the president. In the regressions run for this 
study, the main electoral incentive variables, the “vote share of incumbent president” and 
the “electoral importance” both take the expected negative sign and are statistically 
significant (though the significance of the electoral importance variable is low).  
To compare some of the present results with similar existing literature  
(Langabeer et al., 2012) that covers a different time period (1993-2005), a one-way 
ANOVA was performed on the mean “days to declare disasters” by combinations of 
presidents and governors who may or may not have different party affiliations. The main 
finding here is that the average number of days it takes for a presidential declaration 
changes significantly depending on the combination used. The shortest average delay for 
a presidential disaster declaration in the sample occurs when the president is a 
Republican and the governor is a Democrat. The longest average delay is found when the 
president is a Democrat and the governor is a Republican. This is in contrast to the 
finding by Langabeer et al. (2012) who provide evidence that the shortest delay occurs 
when the president is a Democrat and the governor is a Republican. In addition, they find 
that the longest delay occurred in their data when both the president and the governor 
were from the Democratic Party.  Further regression results obtained in the sample used 
here show that the average number of days it takes for a presidential disaster declaration 
is significantly shorter for the Republican-president-cum-Democratic-governor 
combination than the Democratic-president-cum-Democratic-governor and Democratic-
president-cum-Republican-governor combinations (both at α=0.05), and Republican-
president-cum-Republican-governor combination (at α=0.1). Similarly, the Republican-
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president-cum-Republican-governor combination takes significantly shorter to make a 
presidential disaster declaration than the Democratic-president-cum-Republican-governor 
combination. In short, the conclusion is that generally republican presidents declare 
disasters with a shorter delay than democratic presidents. The differences in results across 
the two samples likely reflect the effect of omitted variables. The finding that if the 
president and the governor belong to different parties it takes longer for the president to 
declare a major disaster is confirmed in other studies. Cox and McCubbins (1993) 
provide a theoretical explanation, while Arulampalam et al. (2004) argue that when the 
electoral returns from spending are shared between state and central government, central 
government loses part of the electoral benefit from spending if the transferred funds go to 
a governor of the opponent party. 
Inclusion of the “FEMA oversight subcommittee membership” variable in the 
regressions allows an exploration of the relationship between the time it takes for a 
presidential declaration and the influence of oversight subcommittee members. Oversight 
committee membership was included as a predictor because several previous studies have 
suggested that membership on such a committee may positively impact the allocation of 
disaster assistance by FEMA. This is a specific instance of the general result found in the 
literature that states receive additional funds if their representatives are members of 
different congressional committees. For instance, Carsey and Rundquist (1999) found 
that states represented by Democrats on a defense committee receive statistically 
significant increases in per-capita military procurement awards. A similar finding is 
reported by Bickers and Stein (2000) who provide evidence that the Republican majority 
of the 104th Congress changed the composition of federal expenditures in favor of 
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programs that are ideologically and politically compatible with the interests of republican 
representatives. Further, the theoretical literature emphasizes other channels through 
which oversight committees influence the budget allocation given their advantage in 
terms of both agenda-setting power and access to information (Shepsle & Weingast, 
1987; McKelvey & Ordeshook, 1980; and Krehbiel, 1991). The empirical literature on 
the influence of congressional committees yield is vast. Typically, this literature focuses 
on specific spending categories rather than on aggregates3. The finding of the current 
paper with respect to the effect of membership in FEMA subcommittees on disaster 
declarations is consistent with the existing literature. As regression results reported in 
Model V, Table 3.3 show, the coefficient of the committee membership variable takes the 
expected sign, though the coefficient is not statistically significant.  
To conclude, results from this study provide evidence that there is a strong link 
between presidential elections and disaster declarations. States showing a higher support 
in the previous election and highly competitive states experience a shorter delay in 
disaster declarations as expected. Additionally, presidential disaster declarations are also 
influenced by the election year: during the election year declaration delays are much 
shorter in comparison other years. The salience of the disaster events as measured by the 
media coverage provides important incentives to decision-makers who are interested in 
increasing their share of the overall vote. The results in this paper show that the influence 
of media coverage in domestic disaster assistance decisions depends on how media 
coverage is measured. The researcher found that while the total number of articles does 
                                                          
3 Some of the studies on committee influence are Aldrich and Rhode (2000), Alvarez and Saving (1997), 
Knight (2005), and Levitt and Poterba (1999).   
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not yield significant results, the number of articles appearing in The New York Times per 
day is negatively and statistically significantly correlated with the time taken for 
presidential disaster declarations.  
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CHAPTER IV 
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS AND FEDERAL PUBLIC WELFARE 
GRANTS 
Abstract 
In this chapter, I explore whether private charitable giving crowds out federal 
government grants to states. Given the complex determinants of federal grants to states, it 
is difficult to identify the crowding out of federal grants by charitable giving at the state 
level, but under certain conditions the study shows that it is possible to find evidence that 
charitable giving leads to a change in the composition of federal grants to states. Using a 
panel of 50 U.S. states over a period 2005 - 2013, I find that there exists a statistically 
significant negative association between charitable contributions and the proportion of 
federal public welfare grants to state governments. 
4.1 Introduction 
Public goods, such as education, health, and welfare programs are typically 
provided by both the public (governmental) and private sectors. Non-governmental 
provision of public goods comes from different sources, the major funding sources being 
nonprofits, private foundations, religious institutions, and bequests. Because the 
governmental and non-governmental sectors interact as providers of public goods, an 
increase in the provision of these goods by one sector may lead to a reduction by the 
other. This is described as the notion of ‘crowding out’ in the context of public good 
provision. When, for instance, government spending on the social safety net increases, 
individual charities or non-profit organizations may decrease their spending on similar 
programs either as a result of reduced charitable contributions by the public or because of 
reduced efforts by charitable organizations to raise funds. This phenomenon can also 
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occur in the opposite direction. Governments may also reduce the amount of public goods 
they supply in response to an increase in the private provision of public goods by non-
governmental organizations or charities.   
Government contributions also come from a number of sources. By directly or 
indirectly financing the provision of public goods in the states of the union, federal 
government transfers to states make up at least partially the gap between the revenues and 
the expenditures of the states. According to the Census Bureau, around 35.5% of U.S. 
state government revenues in 2010 came from federal transfers and more than half of 
these were in the form of welfare grants. The 2010 State Government Finance Summary 
indicates that $315.5 billion out of the total of $555.3 billion federal grants to states were 
allocated as welfare grants. The “public welfare” category includes Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and Medicaid among others. The major non-
welfare sectors that received federal transfer grants were highways and education. 
According to Giving USA (2011), there has been a dramatic increase in charitable 
donations in the United States over the last fifty years. Charitable donations grew from 
$91.2 billion in 1965 to $290 in 2010 and to $358 billion in 2014 (Giving USA, 2015). 
This amount is about 2% of the 2015 U.S. GDP4. The availability of significant amounts 
of charitable donations can make state-level policymakers less enthusiastic about going 
after more federal grants that are categorized as ‘welfare’ but more interested in obtaining 
federal grants allocated to non-welfare purposes (and vice versa). 
                                                          
4 According to a recent estimate by Giving USA, in 2014 major recipient organizations were categorized as 
religion, education, human services, gifts to foundations, and health, in order of magnitude. In terms of 
donors, biggest donors are individuals or households followed by bequests, foundations, and corporations. 
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The existing literature that focuses on the crowding out of charitable donations by 
government spending on public goods dates back to the early 1980s. Warr (1982) and 
Roberts (1984) provide evidence that redistribution by the government causes individual 
donors to reduce their voluntary contributions dollar-for-dollar. This perfect crowding out 
is based on a theoretical framework where individuals are purely altruistic and care only 
about the total amount of public goods provided. Other researchers provide mixed 
evidence on the relationship between government spending and charitable contributions. 
More realistic theoretical models, where individuals are impurely altruistic, have been 
developed by Andreoni (1989, 1990). Much of the work on the magnitude of the 
crowding out of private charitable contributions by government spending has found that 
though there is a crowding-out effect it is less than perfect. However, there are very few 
papers (Garrett & Rhine, 2007; Heutel, 2010; Sav, 2012) that try to identify the direction 
of the causal link that connects charitable donation and government spending, and 
hypothesize that causality is such that it is charitable donations that affect government 
spending. The mechanism suggested here is that a reduction in charitable giving may 
cause fundraisers to seek additional funding from other sources, namely the government. 
A similar line of reasoning is followed by Heutel (2014) who discusses a recent example 
from global public health initiatives that illustrates the phenomenon of the causality 
running from charitable giving to government welfare spending. Smith and MacKellar 
(2007) show that international assistance on health research and development and 
communicable disease control has crowded out recipient country government spending in 
these areas. Moreover, availability of philanthropic funds for medical research in less 
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developed countries is crowding out funding from developed country governments 
(Cohen, 2006). 
Data in the State Government Finances Summary (2010) shows that the 
percentage of welfare grants in total federal grants differs between states by a large 
margin. As an example, in 2010, 73.5% of the total federal grants to Nebraska were 
designated as welfare grants, whereas welfare grants were 21.3% of total grants to 
Wyoming. This paper empirically tests the suggestion by Garrett and Rhine (2007) that 
charitable donations could be an important factor in explaining the difference in the 
proportion of federal welfare grants to U.S. states. Garrett and Rhine (2007) show that as 
more private contributions flow to charitable institutions as a result of increased 
fundraising efforts, these institutions reduce their efforts to obtain federal grants with the 
consequence that federal fund to the institutions decrease. In the empirical model set up 
below, I expect that as a state receives more charitable donations, the amount of federal 
grants/transfers it receives for welfare spending decreases (perhaps as a result of reduced 
effort to obtain such federal funding). 
Following a similar logic, Sav (2012) examines the effect of private giving on the 
state government funding of more than 1000 U.S. public colleges and universities and 
finds that, after controlling for changes in the business cycle and changes in possible 
government spending priorities over time, private donations partially displace state 
government funding at the rate of 83 cents on the dollar (see also Sav (2010) for a similar 
study on the same topic). Another study by Heutel (2010) which examines whether the 
federal government alters its grants in response to the level of private contributions, 
found no evidence of an effect of private donations on government grants. In addition to 
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exploring the mechanism that links government’s response to private charities, Heutel 
(2014) used the signaling model, which posits that government grants function as a signal 
about the quality of nonprofits and result in a crowd in of private donations. 
Heutel (2010) used a large panel data set gathered from the tax returns of 
nonprofit organizations to examine if when the government observes that private 
donations to a charity have risen, there is an effect of a reduction in the government 
support in the area where the charity operates. Heutel (2010) provides evidence that in 
regressions estimating the effect of private donations on government grants, the 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero. Likewise, Garrett and Rhine (2007) 
use co-integration tests to test for long-run relationships between several categories of 
both charitable giving and government spending. They also carried out Granger causality 
tests to find out about the direction of causality in the short-term link that connects 
government spending to charitable giving. Granger causality allowed Garrett and Rhine 
(2007) to examine not only how government spending influences charitable giving, but 
also to look at the possibility that charitable giving can influence government spending. 
While the majority of the causality tests reveal no evidence that charitable giving 
influences government spending, charitable donations in education are shown to 
influence federal spending on education. Using time-series (for the period of 1965 to 
2003) from the United States, Garrett and Rhine (2007) show that a decrease in aggregate 
state and local education spending leads to an increase in charitable donations that goes to 
the education sector, which in turn, leads to a decrease in federal spending on education.  
Most of the literature on the response of the government to private donations has 
characterized the government’s response as “free riding”. In an article on the crowding-
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out of government spending due to private charity, Becker and Lindsay (1994) examine 
the response of state and local governments to voluntary charitable giving and find 
convincing evidence that private charity donations crowd out spending by these 
governments.  
In what follows, I examine the effect of charitable giving on government spending 
on welfare. The study differs from the existing literature in that its focus is on the 
composition of federal grants rather than their absolute level and how the composition is 
influenced by the level of charitable donations. The next section will discuss the types of 
federal aid to state and local governments and is followed by a section that gives a 
general overview of charitable giving in the U.S. After presenting the data and the 
empirical methods used, I set up the empirical model and present the main results 
concerning the causal link between federal grants in public welfare and charitable giving. 
The final section presents the conclusions from the empirical model and its limitations.   
4.1.1 Federal Aid to State and Local Governments 
 
As reported in the Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, the 
percentage of the federal budget allocated to grants to state and local governments has 
fluctuated significantly over time, going from 7.6% in 1960 to 15.5% in 1980, falling 
back to 11 percent in 1990, then rising to almost 17% in 2011. Moreover, in 2010, 55% 
of federal grants were provided by the Department of Health and Human Services. The 
next largest department is Education with 12% of grants, then followed by Transportation 
with 10 percent of the total grants. According to the document  “Federal Aid to States for 
Fiscal Year 2010”, the resources that the federal government allocates to state and local 
governments takes one of the following six forms: 
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• Direct cash grants to state or local government units which can take the form of 
either categorical grants for specific programs (like Head Start) or block grants for 
a general purpose or policy area (like education). 
• Payments for grants-in-kind. Examples include purchases of commodities 
distributed to state or local government institutions, such as food for school lunch 
programs. 
• Payments to non-government entities when such payments result in cash or in-
kind services passed on to state or local governments. One example is payments 
to the American Printing House for the Blind. 
• Payments to regional commissions and organizations that are redistributed at the 
state or local level. Examples include programs such as the Panhandle Regional 
Narcotics Trafficking Task Force (which was disbanded in 2004) or regional 
commissions on environmental quality. 
• Federal government payments to state and local governments for research and 
development. These are an integral part of the provision of public services. 
Examples are research on crime control financed from law enforcement assistance 
grants or research on mental health associated with the provision of mental 
rehabilitation services. 
• Federal revenues shared with state and local governments. These payments to 
state or local governments are computed as a percentage of the proceeds from the 
sale of certain federal property, products, or services (e.g., payments from receipts 
for Oregon and California grant lands) or are other collections by the federal 
government that are passed on to state or local governments. 
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The first of these types, direct cash grants to state or local governmental units, 
represents the most important single type of federal aid. Direct cash grants in turn can be 
divided into two types: categorical grants for specific programs and block grants (for 
general purposes or policy areas that might include a number of related programs). 
Since state and local governments are in the best position to more efficiently and 
effectively implement programs that require localized knowledge and because benefits 
from those programs may extend beyond their jurisdictions, the federal government 
makes grants to state and local governments. Federal grants are also used to redistribute 
resources among communities and individuals. Furthermore, some federal grants can also 
help stabilize the economy and can be used by the federal government to implement its 
priorities (CBO, 2013). 
4.1.2 Charitable giving in the USA 
There are four primary sources of charitable gifts to nonprofit organizations in the 
United States. These are individual or household donations, independent or private 
foundations, corporations, and charitable bequests. Individual gifts are the largest source 
of gifts to charitable causes in the United States. Giving USA 2012 estimates around 73% 
of charitable donations in the U.S. are given by individuals or households.  In 2011, 
estimated individual or household contributions were $217.79 billion an estimates of 
giving by foundations, corporations, and bequest were respectively $41.67 billion, $14.55 
billion, and $24.41 billion.  
 
61 
 
 
Figure 4.1. 2011 contributions by the type of recipient organization (in billions of dollars 
–all figures are rounded) (Source: Giving USA, 2012) 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the major recipient organizations operate in fields 
categorized as religious, educational, human services, foundations, and health. Estimates 
by Giving USA indicate that the relative size of donors and recipient types have remained 
somewhat the same for several years. 
Because the focus in this study is on the impact of charitable giving in a state, a 
discussion on the workings of nonprofit charitable organizations engaged in public 
welfare is helpful in understanding the importance of charitable giving. First, investment 
income, contributions, and program service revenues are the three major sources of 
revenues for nonprofit charitable organizations exempt from the income tax under 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 501 (c) (3). Of the total reported revenue of $1.6 
trillion in 2010, $344.9 billion was received from donors and grant makers (Arnsberger, 
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2014)5. The National Center for Charitable Statistics classifies tax-exempt entities into 
nine major categories. According to this classification, the three major categories of 
nonprofit charitable organizations in terms of total assets and revenue in 2010 are health, 
education, and human services. Other major areas where tax-exempt nonprofit 
organizations serve functions are the arts, culture and humanities, the environment, 
animal welfare, international and foreign affairs, mutual membership benefit, public 
societal benefit, and religion related. 
4.1.3 Charitable giving and itemized deductions 
 
Because state-wise charitable giving is key to the study, individual or household 
itemized contributions reported by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will be used in our 
analysis instead of the national aggregates estimated by Giving USA Foundation, which 
are not decomposed to the state level. A widely used and readily available measure of 
state-wise charitable giving in terms of both the extent and depth is provided in Gabler et 
al., (2012). The percentage of tax filers who donate to charity indicates the extent of 
generosity, while the percentage of aggregate personal income donated to charity 
indicates the depth of charitable giving. 2011 tax return data indicates that nationwide 
26% of tax filers donated to charity, while the percentage of aggregate income donated 
was at 2.09%6.  
                                                          
5 Private foundations, religious organizations and nonprofit with less than $50,000 revenue that are not 
required to file tax return are not included in this amount. 
6 Although here the motivations behind charitable giving and particularly motivations for itemized 
deductions are not considered here, the fact that “as your income tax bracket increases, the real cost of your 
charitable gift decreases, making contributions more attractive for those in higher brackets” helps explain 
why high income individuals and households are likely to opt for an itemized deduction rather than a 
standard deduction in their tax returns. 
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Another measure of charitable giving used by Havens and Schervish (2005) 
calculates the ratio of the share of contributions to the share of the income of the state, 
indicating how the charitable giving by the residents of a state is related to their income. 
The authors use three measures of aggregate household income: gross household income, 
gross household income after taxes, and gross household income after taxes adjusted for 
cost of living. Average charitable contributions per return and average charitable 
contributions per return with itemized charitable contributions are also used to make 
comparisons across states. Statistics of Income (SoI) IRS (2011) shows that West 
Virginia with $620 and Utah with $2,515 had respectively the minimum and the 
maximum average charitable contributions per return. Similarly, Rhode Island with 
$2,789 and Wyoming with $9,870 are the states with the minimum and the maximum 
average charitable contributions per return with itemized charitable contributions. 
In what follows the first of these methods assesses the relative position of a state 
in terms of charitable giving. Percentage of adjusted gross income donated and reported 
in IRS itemized deductions will be the main variable of interest. As the percentage of 
charitable contributions in the state of Utah is exceptionally higher in all sample years 
compared to the rest of U.S. states, Utah is considered to be an outlier with a special 
culture of charity and it is excluded from the sample in our regression models. 
4.2 Data and Method 
Following the theoretical literature on crowding out (Andreoni, 1989 and 1990; 
Warr, 1982) and the empirical literature that focuses on the causal link running from 
charitable giving to federal welfare grants (Garrett & Rhine, 2007; Heutel, 2010; and Sav, 
2012), in this chapter I tested two main hypotheses: (1) charitable giving in a state will 
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crowd out the proportion of public welfare federal grants allocated to state and local 
governments, and (2) charitable giving in a state will crowd out the proportion of public 
welfare federal grants allocated to state governments. 
This study uses State Government Finances, and State and Local Government 
Finance, U.S. Census Bureau for data on dependent variables: percentage of federal 
grants allocated to public welfare, per-capita public welfare grants, and public welfare 
expenditures as percent of direct general expenditures. Data for the main explanatory 
variable, that is annual charitable contributions as percent of adjusted gross income, are 
drawn from the Statistics of Income, Internal Revenue Service. Party affiliations of state 
Governors are obtained from the National Governors Association. Percentage of state-
wise congressional delegates from the Democratic Party comes from the U.S. Congress 
website. All other demographic variables are obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Federal public welfare grants are a part of total federal grants allocated to 
different spending categories such as public welfare, highways, education, and health and 
hospital. Public welfare expenditures are calculated as the percentage of State and Local 
government direct general expenditures7. All expenditures, charitable donations, and 
incomes denoted in dollars are per capita figures and have been converted to 2011 dollars 
using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Controls for economic, demographic, and political 
conditions include the following variables: the age dependency ratio, child dependency 
                                                          
7 Direct general expenditures by state and local governments are allocated to the following functions: 
education services, social services and income maintenance, transportation, public safety, environment and 
housing, governmental administration, interest on general debt, and other general expenditures. Only 
“general” state and local revenues and expenditures have been included (leaving out liquor stores, utilities, 
and insurance trust funds, which comprise approximately 7.5% of total expenditures and 11.5% of total 
revenues). 
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ratio, old-age dependency ratio, percent of state population below 100%, 135%, and 
150% poverty, percent of homeowners, miles per-capita, the fraction of the states’ U.S. 
Congress and Senate delegations that are Democrats, a dummy for whether the state 
governor is a Democrat, and the non-white population8. The next section discusses the 
reasons why these control variables are included in the regressions.  
As Table 4.2 shows, the differences in the proportion of federal grants allocated to 
public welfare can be substantial among states. In one sample year, for example, public 
welfare grants accounted for 70% of the federal grants received by Ohio, whereas in the 
same year for North Dakota this proportion was only 42%. While this difference may be 
due to a number of different factors, it is useful to ask how much of it can be attributed to 
nonprofit charitable activity in the state, measured here by charitable giving as percent of 
adjusted gross income. For this purpose I estimated the following equation: PRFEDPWst =  αs +  βt +  γR +  θ1CHARGIVist − 2 +   θ Zst − 1 +  εst ,
𝑠𝑠 =  1, … .50;   𝑡𝑡 =  2005, … . .2013;  R =  MidWest, NorthEast, South, and West 
where, PRFEDPWst denotes the proportion of federal grants to a state that is 
allocated to public welfare in state s in year t. State-fixed effects, year dummies, and 
region dummies are denoted by αs, βt, and  γR respectively. CHARGIVist-2 , the main 
explanatory variable, is the percentage of adjusted gross income that is reported as 
charitable giving in IRS tax filings two years previously, but are reported to the public in 
                                                          
8 The age dependency ratio is derived by dividing the combined under-18 and 65-and-over populations by 
the 18-to-64 population and multiplying by 100.  The child dependency ratio is derived by dividing the 
population under 18 by the 18-to-64 population and multiplying by 100. The old-age dependency ratio is 
derived by dividing the population 65 and over by the 18-to-64 population and multiplying by 100. 
66 
 
the current year in Statistics of Income (SOI). Zst-1 is a vector that includes all economic, 
political and demographic control variables. These are the percentage of population 
below 100%, 135%, and 150% ; age dependency ratio, child dependency ratio, old age 
dependency ratio, percent of non-white population, percent of homeowners, miles per-
capita, percent of congressional delegates from the Democratic Party in a state, and 
dummy variables indicating whether the U.S. president and the state governor are 
democrats. 
In an effort to use as reliable information as possible on annual charitable giving 
in a state, an attempt was made to extract the tax return information of 501 (c) (3) public 
charities. Such tax-exempt organizations file Form 990. The problem with the forms 990, 
Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax and the 990-EZ worksheet available 
from IRS is that, they report aggregates on the form as “Contributions, gifts, grants and 
other similar amounts” which is composed of (1a) Federated campaigns, (b) Membership 
dues, (c) Fundraising events, (d) Related organizations, (e) Government grants 
(contributions), (f) All other contributions, gifts, grants, and similar amounts not included 
above, and (g) Noncash contributions included in lines 1a-1f. To obtain more granular 
information, data on charitable donations was used from individual and household 
itemized deductions in the IRS form 1040. Because gifts and contributions above $250 or 
more can be deducted from taxable income all contributions above $250 or more are 
reported on Form 1040 if the filers have itemized the deduction instead of choosing the 
standard deduction. The drawback of using the Form 1040 individual returns to obtain 
data on charitable giving is that only about 33% of U.S. taxpayers chose to itemize 
deductions on their tax return in 2010. However, this may not be a significant drawback 
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as Giving USA estimates that giving through individual itemized deductions represents 
about 80% of all individual or household giving in the U.S. 
The dependent variables used in the empirical model are specific revenue and 
expenditure components of state and local governments. Government finance statistics 
reported by the U.S. Census Bureau categorize the government fiscal activity in four 
broad sectors: general government, utilities, liquor stores, and insurance trust. Our main 
dependent variable, the proportion of public welfare grants in total federal government 
grants, and public welfare expenditures are calculated using the ‘general government’ 
category amounts as the denominator. The “general government” quantities reported 
include all government revenue and expenditure activities related to general government 
functions such as public protection, education, health and welfare. 
4.1.1 Modeling Federal aid to state and local government in the presence of 
charitable giving 
 
The hypothesis that there exists a reverse causality running from charitable giving 
to federal welfare grants is in part motivated by the work of Garrett & Rhine (2007), and 
Heutel (2014). In these papers the question of reverse causality is treated as an extension 
to the main empirical model, which tests the effects of government spending in specific 
sectors on charitable giving. Garrett & Rhine (2007) hypothesize that a reduction in 
charitable giving may cause fundraisers to seek additional funding from other sources 
such as the federal government. Thus, the mechanism they consider is an indirect one. 
Heutel (2014), on the other hand, focuses on the efforts of individual charity 
administrators to substitute funds from federal grants for money received from individual 
donors.  
68 
 
The mechanism I hypothesize here is that in response to changes in charitable 
giving state administrators themselves attempt to change the composition of the federal 
grants that the state receives and may also do the same for state spending by changing its 
allocation to different areas that are important for their constituents. This would 
especially be true in cases where the federal government is largely unaware of changes in 
charitable giving and the private provision of public goods (such as welfare, safety net) in 
a state. As assistance from the private sector becomes an important part of total welfare 
spending within a state9, the burden on public sector safety net programs (which are also 
known as welfare programs) eases, which in turn may lead state administrators to reduce 
the state expenditure in these areas.10  
 Federal provision of social services may be direct or indirect. While direct 
federal provision of social services is relatively minor, the federal government delivers a 
significant amount of social services indirectly through state and local governments and 
nonprofit non-governmental organizations. The latter receive funds from the federal, 
state, and local governments as well as from private donors. State governments take into 
consideration these different providers of services within their state when making 
decisions on how much of their own resources to allocate to these services and how much 
federal assistance to ask for.   
                                                          
9 According to Crowe (2015), in 2010, there were approximately 124,360 public charities that registered as 
human service organizations with the IRS. With reported $189.9 billion in expenses they comprised 34% of 
the entire non-profit sector (Blackwood et al. 2012). These community based organizations work to meet 
the needs of low-income families and bridge the gap by offering services not provided by the government 
programs. Major assistance provided by the community-based organizations are food, clothing, housing 
and cash assistance. 
10 Note that, although service provided by non-profits that receive reimbursement grants under government 
contract is significant part of spending for some non-profits, such reimbursements are not treated as part of 
charitable giving in a state.   
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In this chapter our focus is on the federal provision of social services (aka 
‘welfare’) through grants to state governments and their interaction with the services 
provided by nonprofit organizations.  To understand the complex web of interactions 
involving these three actors (namely, the federal and state governments and charitable 
organizations), it is important to understand how federal government grants to states are 
defined and measured as well as the resources that the states can marshal to fund their 
own welfare spending. In terms of measurement the present chapter takes a somewhat 
different approach than the previous literature on the subject.11 Thus, while Garrett and 
Rhine (2007) use the dollar amount of grants and spending in response to charitable 
giving in a state, here this study uses the proportion of welfare grants and spending 
allocated by federal and state governments in response to charitable giving in a state. This 
particular form for the response variable is borrowed from Livingston (2012), who 
focuses on the change in charitable spending rather than the change in donations in 
response to changes in government poverty relief spending. Livingston’s belief that in 
response to government spending “charity managers may choose to smooth out spending 
by either having a surplus or deficit at the end of the year, utilizing other revenue sources, 
or spending additional time fundraising” seems relevant here as well. I hypothesize that 
instead of the absolute change in the dollar amount of the grants and spending, the change 
in its proportion will provide more reliable information as to whether there is crowding 
out or crowding in of government spending. It is, for instance, conceivable that total 
                                                          
11 Garrett and Rhine (2007) is the only article that tests for crowding out of government grants and 
spending in response to charitable giving in a state. There is however a small literature (see Sav, 2010, 
2012) that looks at the response of state education spending to the level of fundraising by colleges and 
universities.  
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federal government grants to a state may rise while the proportion allocated to welfare 
spending fall in response to an increase charitable giving. 
Although there may be several different reasons for government spending to 
crowd out private contributions, crowding out in the opposite direction occurs as state 
governments choose to reallocate their limited resources to other areas of need. 
Theoretically, this is a situation where the state government chooses an optimal level of 
the provision of a public good and the contributions from the private sector or individual 
donors induces the state government to adjust its funding to attain a new optimal. To see 
what is involved in principle, observe Figure 2.2 adapted from Steinberg (1989). The 
figure illustrates simple crowding-out where government spending on public goods 
responds to a change in private charitable giving.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Simple crowd-out model. 
 
While the effect of spending by the state government is controlled in the simple 
crowding-out model, the joint crowding-out model, as shown in Figure 4.3 adapted from 
Steinberg (1989), estimates the total effect of charitable donations in a state. The total 
effect comes from two sources; directly from charitable donations to federal government 
spending, and charitable donations indirectly affecting federal spending through state 
spending. Joint crowding-out is based on the assumption that both the federal government 
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and the state government react to the level of provision of public goods by nonprofit 
organizations in the state. Thus joint crowding-out estimates the sum of direct and 
feedback or indirect effects.  
 
 
 Figure 4.3 Joint crowd-out model 
While simple and joint crowding-out are appropriate when estimating changes in 
per-capita government spending in response to a change in charitable donations, 
aggregate crowding-out will estimate the combined effect on the proportion of 
government (federal and state) spending allocated to a specific area in response to a 
change in charitable donations. Aggregate crowding-out takes a weighted average of 
proportions of spending allocated by the state and federal governments, so that there is 
only one equation in the aggregate crowding-out model. The aggregate crowding-out 
model is based on the assumption that in making their spending decisions the federal and 
state governments take into account each other’s reactions to a change in charitable 
giving.  
In crowding-out models where charitable contributions are affected by 
government spending, endogeneity is a serious empirical problem in running an OLS 
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(Ordinary Least Squares) (Horne, 2006).  Sources of endogenous government spending 
may stem from some events that raise demands for both government and private 
contributions, such as natural disasters. This problem is less likely to occur in the 
empirical setup here, which focuses on the reverse crowding-out. Moreover, it is the 
lagged values of charitable donations that are hypothesized to affect federal and state 
spending. Specifically, charitable donations in the two previous years can be considered 
to be exogenous to current events that may determine current federal and state 
government spending. 
4.2.2 Political factors 
 
The allocation of federal grants to state and local governments in the U.S. is the 
outcome of a complex process involving many institutional players and state level 
demographic and economic factors. In this section is a brief survey of the relevant 
literature to see which political factors come into play in determining federal grants to 
states.  
In an examination of the consequences of senate apportionment for the 
geographical distribution of federal funds, Lee (1998) found that states that are 
overrepresented in the Senate are likely to receive greater amount of per capita federal 
funding, controlling for other factors. Hoover and Pecorino (2005) obtain a similar result 
using a different and longer time period. They find the strongest effect of senate 
representation in procurement. Moreover, they present evidence that presidential 
influence is also important in awarding project grants. Larcinese et.al. (2006), in their 
examination of the allocation of revenues to states as affected by presidential politics, 
find that a greater amount federal aid goes to states that support the party of the current 
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president. In addition, states that have governors and legislators who are affiliated with 
the party of the current U.S. president or the party that has the majority in the Senate or 
the house receive favorable treatment in terms of amount of federal aid (see Hankins 
et.al., 2015, Lazarus and Steigerwalt, 2009 and Carsey and Rundquist, 1999). 
Religious beliefs and political ideology also play a role in determining the level of 
charitable giving in a given state. A recent analysis by the Chronicle of Philanthropy 
finds evidence that people in red states are more generous in their charitable contribution 
and that the 17 most “generous” states voted for Mitt Romney in the last presidential 
election, while, the seven states at the bottom of the list voted for Barack Obama. It has 
also been hypothesized that states whose residents prefer redistribution tend to elect 
representatives who allocate a higher proportion of spending on public welfare. With 
these two issues in mind, I analyzed the correlation between levels of charitable giving 
and the percentage of democrat congressional delegates from a state on the one hand and 
whether the state governor is a democrat on the other hand. The correlation coefficients 
were within the acceptable range and multicollinearity in regressions was not an issue. 
A few papers also study the percentage of each state’s House and Senate 
delegations separately to determine whether they align with majorities in the House or the 
Senate and whether such alignments affect how federal funds are allocated (Hankins, 
et.al. 2015; Hoover and Pecorino 2005; and Young and Sobel 2013). These studies find 
that Senate-level variables affect federal spending differently than House-level variables. 
This study next examines the proportion of federal funding in specific categories and 
focuses on the percentage of democrats elected to the House from the state to assess voter 
preferences for welfare spending.  
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4.1.2 Demographic control variables  
State welfare spending depends crucially on economic factors, among which 
poverty thresholds and levels are the most important determinants of welfare spending.  
In what follows I use the poverty level reported for each state for each year in the Annual 
Social and Economic Supplements of Current Population Survey. The Survey categorizes 
individuals or families as ‘poor’ if their annual pre-tax cash income is below a dollar 
amount, or a poverty threshold, which is calculated each year at the federal level. As 
poverty thresholds are historically used as yardsticks for progress in antipoverty efforts 
and guide the planning and formulation of antipoverty measures, they are important 
factors in public welfare spending.  
To see what is involved when poverty thresholds are used, observe Table 4.1 
which provides an illustration of the poverty threshold in the most recent estimates of the 
Census Bureau. 
 
  
75 
 
Table 4.1 Preliminary estimate of weighted average poverty thresholds for 2014. 
          Size of Family Unit      Estimated Threshold 
          1 person (unrelated individual) $12,081  
             Under 65 years    12,316  
             65 years and over   11,354  
               2 people  $15,388  
             Householder under 65 years    15,933  
             Householder 65 years and over   14,324  
               3 people  $18,853  
          4 people   24,221  
          5 people    28,724  
          6 people    32,443  
          7 people    36,974  
          8 people    41,141  
          9 people or more    48,845  
 
The Census Bureau preliminary estimate for 2014 considers a four-person family 
poor if its annual cash income is below $24,221 when income is measured as a weighted 
average. A four-person family with two adults and two children is categorized as poor if 
its cash income is below $24,008 when the poverty threshold is measured by the size of 
family and the number of related children under 28 years (not shown in Table 4.1). The 
poverty thresholds used in this chapter are percentages of population that fall below 
different percentage-level poverty thresholds. The reference percentages of poverty 
threshold used in this chapter are 100%, 135% and 150%. 
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There are many federal programs categorized as public welfare spending that use 
different levels of poverty thresholds as guidelines in determining eligibility. Some of 
these are Community Service Block Grants, Head Start, Supplemental Nutrition Program 
(SNAP, formerly Food Stamp Program), National School Lunch Program, and Child and 
Adult Care Food Program. Major mean-tested programs such as Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Security Income, the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC), and Social Service Block Grants do not use poverty guidelines in 
determining eligibility   
One issue that arises when using poverty thresholds as regressors is that poverty 
levels can potentially be thought of as endogenous. The validity of the poverty level as a 
regressor in our empirical model is based on the observation that it takes several years for 
the intended effect of government spending to be realized. Moreover, this study uses 
lagged values of poverty levels to deal with the potential problem of endogeneity. It is 
hard to argue convincingly that current welfare spending affects poverty levels in 
previous years.  
Interstate and year-to-year differences in the proportion of welfare spending can 
be further controlled either by including separate dummy variables for the states and 
years in the regression equation or by using demographic variables that are likely to 
explain the variation of tastes across states. Even after controlling for state demographic 
variables, including state and year fixed-effects will help capture any effects of 
unobservable variables across states and years. 
Including the proportion of non-white population in the empirical model may 
have two effects. First, this population may have a different perceived need for public 
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welfare spending that may be due to special affirmative action needed beyond those 
associated with poverty. Second, voters and policy makers in a state may have different 
preferences for public welfare if recipients of such programs are non-white. The 
importance of including the proportion of non-white population in determining the level 
of welfare spending is discussed in length in Alesian et.al. (2001), who find that race is 
the most important predictor of the support for welfare. The proportion of the immigrant 
population can be another explanatory variable that helps determine the proportion of 
welfare spending. However, there is empirical evidence that immigrants tend to live in 
states that offer the highest welfare benefits (Borjas, 1999). If this is the case, including 
the proportion of the immigrant population in the regression will give rise to the 
endogeneity problem. 
Following the previous literature (Lindsey and Steinberg 1990), I include road 
mileage per capita by state in the regressions as a regressor to control for the possible 
effect of population dispersion on state spending on public welfare. A population that is 
more dispersed throughout the state is expected to increase the cost of welfare spending 
and, thus, lead to higher spending ceteris paribus.   
Finally, the study includes a variable representing the percentage of homeowners 
in the state as a regressor. Homeowners tend to be more sensitive to increases in property 
taxes than renters. Moreover, as homeowners prefer to allocate more resources to 
programs associated with housing, such as mortgage credit, they tend to prefer, ipso 
facto, reduced welfare spending.   
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4.3 Results and Discussions 
 
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Public welfare grant as % of total federal grants  
to State and Local Governments 400 16.10 66.43 49.01 9.55 
Real per-capita public welfare grant to  
State and Local Governments (2011 dollars) 400 344.73 2024.47 955.00 304.29 
Public welfare as % of state and local government  
direct general expenditure (including own source) 400 9.76 27.00 17.96 3.64 
Real per-capita public welfare expenditure by  
state and local governments (including own source) 400 654.13 2616.02 1457.40 399.27 
Public welfare as % of total federal grants to states 450 17.05 74.33 54.11 10.14 
Real per-capita public welfare grant to states 450 344.71 2016.62 953.46 304.77 
Public welfare as % of state direct general  
expenditure (including own source) 450 14.20 41.34 26.72 5.08 
Real per-capita public welfare expenditure by  
states (including own source) 450 631.39 2892.45 1479.44 411.55 
Charitable contributions as % of Adjusted Gross  
Income (as reported in IRS itemized deductions) 450 1.22 5.21 2.21 0.60 
Real per-capita charitable contributions (2011 dollars) 450 249.16 1234.80 578.36 165.66 
Percent of population below 100% poverty 450 5.43 23.11 12.89 3.28 
below 135% 450 8.91 31.88 19.16 4.35 
below 150% 450 10.46 35.55 21.95 4.75 
Age dependency ratio 450 51.42 68.43 59.21 3.25 
Child dependency ratio 450 30.91 52.90 38.53 3.44 
Old age dependency ratio 450 9.78 29.76 20.68 3.10 
Percent of non-white population 450 3.28 74.35 18.44 12.04 
Percent of homeowners 450 53.60 81.30 69.72 4.88 
Miles per-capita 450 0.007 0.277 0.048 0.049 
Percent of congressional delegates from democrats 450 0.00 100 48.82 26.16 
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President-Democrat 450 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50 
State Governor- Democrat 450 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.50 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 4.2 show that dependent variables that measure 
grants received by and spending done by ‘state and local government’ contain 400 
observations, whereas dependent variables that pertain only to states and all other 
explanatory variables have 450 observations. The reason for this difference is the 
unavailability of data pertaining to ‘state and local’ for the most recent year in the 
sample. Despite the availability of 400 and 450 observations, the regression models 
presented in Tables 4.3 and onwards consider only 392 and 441 observations 
respectively. The smaller number of observations is due to exclusion of an outlier state 
(Utah) from the sample. As can be seen in Table 4.2, the independent variable ‘charitable 
contributions as % of Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) takes a maximum value of 5.21%. 
The state of Utah has this considerably higher level of charitable contributions as % of 
AGI for all the sample years and is excluded from the sample. 
 The main variable of interest, ‘the percentage of federal grants that is 
dedicated to public welfare’, takes the minimum of 16% and the maximum of 66% for 
state and local governments, these figures for state governments are 17% and 74% 
respectively. Finally, the main explanatory variable ‘charitable contribution as percent of 
AGI’ takes a mean of 2.21% (SD=0.6) while the ‘real per-capita charitable contribution 
(2011 dollars)’ takes a mean of $578 (SD= $166). 
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Table 4.3 Effects of charitable contributions on federal public welfare grants and own source expenditure of state and local 
governments. 
 
Public Welfare as % of Total  
grants to State and Local Governments 
Real Per-capita public welfare grant 
to State and Local Governments 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Charitable Contribution as % of AGI or  
Per capita Charitable Contributions -3.762** (1.112) -0.54 (0.974) 0.022 (0.110) -0.414** (0.098) 
Percent below 135% poverty -0.009 (0.100) 0.70** (0.111) 1.751 (3.701) 38.574** (4.251) 
below 100% # -0.098 (0.121) 0.807** (0.143) 2.330 (4.477) 46.553** (5.334) 
below 150% # -0.011 (0.097) 0.649** (0.101) 2.132 (3.573) 35.987** (3.888) 
Age dependency ratio -0.209 (0.164) 0.752** (0.144) -4.020 (6.062) -13.259** (4.94) 
Child dependency ratio# -0.452* (0.270) 0.191 (0.191) -19.357* (10.703) -5.607 (6.362) 
Old age dependency ratio# -0.045 (0.165) 0.575** (0.138) 2.496 (6.026) -8.893** (4.725) 
Percentage of Non-white population 0.475 (0.275) -0.121** (0.039) -2.842 (10.095) 5.554** (1.332) 
Percentage of homeowners -0.100 (0.141) -0.095 (0.096) 2.947 (5.142) 11.053 (3.424) 
Miles Per-capita 93.039 (79.46) -99.11** (8.350) 4153.743 (3031.816) 278.858 (292.771) 
Percentage of Democrat  
Congressional Delegates -0.008 (0.008) 0.055** (0.014) 0.611** (0.282) 0.54 (0.486) 
Democratic President -dummy -1.779** (0.492)   -- 
 
162.182** (18.669) 
 
-- 
Democratic Governor -dummy -0.253 (0.443) 0.392 (0.711) 33.172** (16.17) 21.203 (24.511) 
Region- dummies -- 
   
-- 
   Northeast 
  
1.027 (1.265) 
  
329.331** (43.25) 
South 
  
-4.748** (1.349) 
  
-181.325** (46.216) 
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Table 4.3 continued. 
       
 
 
West 
  
-11.118** (1.114) 
  
-84.877** (42.426) 
State Fixed Effect Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 Year Fixed Effect No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations: 392 
 
392 
 
392 
 
392 
  
Table 4.3 columns continued. 
 
Public Welfare as % of State and Local  
Governments general expenditure 
Real per-capita public welfare expenditure 
by State and local Governments 
Independent Variables (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Charitable Contribution as % of AGI or  
Per capita Charitable Contributions -1.133** (0.3531) -1.737** (0.422) -0.162 (0.106) -0.385** (0.128) 
Percent below 135% poverty 0.072** (0.032) 0.193** (0.045) 10.389** (3.755) 13.956** (5.583) 
below 100% # 0.097** (0.038) 0.252** (0.06) 13.874** (4.456) 16.538** (6.964) 
below 150% # 0.07** (0.031) 0.166** (0.041) 10.08** (3.603) 11.96** (5.11) 
Age dependency ratio 0.168** (0.056) 0.009 (0.062) 5.805 (6.404) -29.154** (6.450) 
Child dependency ratio# 0.039 (0.086) -0.423** (0.07) -55.212** (9.044) -11.565 (8.06) 
Old age dependency ratio# 0.144** (0.055) 0.308** (0.06) 28.213** (5.942) -19.26** (6.2) 
Percentage of Non-white population 0.33** (0.087) -0.072** (0.017) 47.565** (9.993) 4.68** (1.734) 
Percentage of homeowners -0.13** (0.048) 0.084 (0.038) -5.066 (5.412) 4.574 (4.465) 
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Miles per-capita 98.962** (25.291) -21.855** (3.727) -3733.751 (2936.628) -315.688 (382.593) 
Democratic Governor -dummy -0.042 (0.151) 0.281 (0.345) 25.724 (17.083) 31.776 (32.064) 
Region- dummies -- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
   Northeast 
      
482.52** (56.734) 
South 
      
-211.429** (60.715) 
West 
      
-133.398** (50.376) 
State Fixed Effect Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 Year Fixed Effect No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations: 392 
 
329 
 
392 
 
392 
 ** p<0.05, *p<0.1; numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
# are the coefficient from separate regressions, corresponding coefficients for other variables are not reported here. 
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Table 4.4 Effects of charitable contributions on federal public welfare grants and own source expenditure of state governments. 
 
Public Welfare as % of Total Federal  
grants to State Governments 
Real Per-capita public welfare grant 
to State Governments 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Charitable Contribution as % of AGI 
or per-capita Charitable Contributions -2.198* (1.164) -1.828* (1.032) 0.019 (0.107 -0.408** (0.095) 
Percent below 135% poverty -0.042 (0.105) 0.393** (0.106) 1.184 (3.543 39.262** (4.066) 
below 100% # -0.168 (0.127) 0.571** (0.140) 1.831 (4.291 47.243** (5.111) 
below 150% # -0.111 (0.101) 0.341** (0.096) 1.588 (3.427) 35.844** (3.753) 
Age dependency ratio 0.041 (0.155) 1.263** (0.148) -4.595 (5.241) -14.241** (4.756) 
Child dependency ratio# -0.517* (0.271) 0.108 (0.194) -8.894 (9.519) -3.813 (6.102) 
Old age dependency ratio# 0.196 (0.150) 1.188** (0.149) -1.772 (5.067) -10.732** (4.539) 
Percentage of Non-white population 0.750** (0.269) -0.201** (0.040) -6.046 (9.070) 5.056** (1.260) 
Percentage of homeowners -0.220 (0.138) -0.125 (0.090) 5.153 (4.662) 12.518** (3.234) 
Miles Per-capita 99.144 (74.75) -121.87** (8.8) 4459.3* (2608.17) 283.533 (279) 
Percentage of Democrat  
Congressional Delegates -0.010 (0.008) 0.082** (0.016) 0.689** (0.274) 0.795* (0.464) 
Democratic President -dummy -1.848** (0.518) - 
 
159.192** (17.838) 
  Democratic Governor -dummy -0.331 (0.413) -0.110 (0.811) 23.828* (13.848) 12.581 (23.389) 
Region- dummies 
        Northeast 
      
313.737** (41.171) 
South 
      
-189.024** (43.982) 
West 
      
-84.996** (36.526) 
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State Fixed Effect Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 Year Fixed Effect No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations: 441 
 
441 
 
441 
 
441 
  
Table 4.4 columns continued. 
 
Public Welfare as % of State 
Governments General Expenditure 
Real per-capita public welfare expenditure 
by State Governments 
Independent Variables (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Charitable Contribution as % of AGI 
or per-capita Charitable contributions -1.308** (0.501) 0.073 (0.495) -0.035 (0.096) -0.260** (0.127) 
Percent below 135% poverty 0.166** (0.046) 0.213** (0.053) 8.123** (3.352) 25.932** (5.478) 
below 100% # 0.220** (0.054) 0.321** (0.069) 10.203** (3.987) 29.127** (6.867) 
below 150% # 0.130** (0.045) 0.173** (0.048) 7.489** (3.237) 22.859** (5.056) 
Age dependency ratio 0.200** (0.071) 0.296** (0.073) 6.824 (5.125) -35.030** (6.366) 
Child dependency ratio# -0.043 (0.116) -0.380** (0.085) -50.285** (7.706) -11.091 (7.975) 
Old age dependency ratio# 0.194** (0.067) 0.568** (0.069) 23.582** (4.653) -24.744** (6.135) 
Percentage of Non-white population 0.433** (0.115) -0.174** (0.019) 51.936** (8.324) 4.837** (1.679) 
Percentage of homeowners -0.153** (0.063) -0.164** (0.045) -5.154 (4.536) 4.281 (4.331) 
Miles Per-capita 147.35** (32.17) -56.074** (4.371) 631.905 (2344.11) -334.93 (374.54) 
Democratic Governor -dummy -0.100 (0.191) 0.131 (0.401) 35.524** 13.613 45.146 (31.216) 
Region- dummies 
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Northeast 
      
503.622** (55.318) 
South 
      
-
241.581** (59.266) 
West 
      
-
111.692** (49.167) 
State Fixed Effect Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 Year Fixed Effect No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations: 441 
 
441 
 
441 
 
441 
 ** p<0.05, *p<0.1; # are the coefficient from separate regressions, corresponding coefficients for other variables are not reported here.    
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A panel of 49 U.S. states (with Utah excluded as an outlier in terms of annual 
percent of charitable contributions) over a 9 year period (2005-2013) is used to run a 
panel regression. The panel structure allows using state-fixed effects and region-fixed 
effects to account for state and region-specific unobserved heterogeneity. The year fixed-
effects capture anything that is specific to certain years but common to all the states (such 
as a nationwide recession).  
The chapter’s primary contributions are summarized in Table 4.3, model (1) and 
(2) and Table 4.4, model (1) and (2). Models (1) and (2) examine the effect of charitable 
contributions in a state in the previous two years on the of proportion of federal grants 
dedicated to welfare spending in the current year (in state and local government budgets 
for Table 4.3 and the state government alone for Table 4.4). Models (3)-(8) examine the 
effect of charitable giving on per-capita federal public welfare grant (3and 4), public 
welfare as a percentage of general expenditure (5 and 6), and per-capita public welfare 
expenditure (7 and 8).  Thus, models (1)- (4) use only federal grants to calculate the 
proportional and per-capita effects and models (5)-(8) use general expenditures of state 
governments (which includes state’s own revenues in addition to federal grants) to do the 
same. 
The results provide evidence that the effect of charitable contributions (as a 
percentage of adjusted gross income) on the proportion of federal grants allocated to 
welfare spending is statistically significant and in the expected direction. In Table 4.3, 
model (1), a coefficient of -3.762 indicates that a one percent increase in charitable 
contributions in a state reduces the proportion of federal grants dedicated to welfare by 
3.76 percent (p<0.05). In other words, charitable giving leads to a significant crowding 
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out of federal welfare spending in the state. This model includes state fixed effects but no 
year effects. In Model (2), which introduces year fixed effects and region dummies, but 
leaves out state fixed effects and the Democratic President dummy, the effect of 
charitable giving on the proportion of welfare grants becomes statistically insignificant. 
However, the inverse relationship still persists.  
The effect of charitable contributions on the proportion of federal grants dedicated 
to welfare programs to state governments is also found to have the expected negative sign 
and to be statistically significant. In table 4.4, model (1), a coefficient of -2.198 shows 
that a one percent increases in charitable contributions reduces the proportion of public 
welfare grants by the federal government to the states by 2.198%.  This result can also be 
interpreted as indicating that an increase in charitable giving by one standard deviation 
(an increase of 0.6 percent in sample) would lead to a reduction in the proportion of 
public welfare grants to state government by 1.32 percentage points. 
A sensitivity analysis was conducted for the effects of income and demographic 
variables that are considered to be important factors in determining eligibility into many 
state and federal public welfare programs. Different measures of the percentage of 
population below federal poverty level were tested, and dependency ratios for their effect 
on the main explanatory variable. The results were reported in tables 4.3 and 4.4 where 
percentages below 100% and 150% of the federal poverty level were used, as well as 
child dependency and old age dependency ratios in place of the percentage below 135% 
of the federal poverty level, and age dependency ratio in the baseline model. Focusing on 
model (1) in table 4.3 and 4.4, it can seen that the only instance where the effect of the 
poverty level or the dependency ratio becoming significant is the case where the child 
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dependency ratio replaces the age dependency ratio. In model (2) in both tables 4.3 and 
4.4, the effect of the dependency ratio becomes insignificant if using the child 
dependency rather than the age dependency ratio in baseline model. For state and local 
government aggregates, whose regression results are shown in table 4.3, the coefficients 
of the main explanatory variable all fall into a 95% confidence interval. Changes in the 
significance levels of the coefficients in any of the regressions were not observed in cases 
of the state or local aggregates. The only exception is presented in table 4.4, which 
reports only the results of state regressions, where the coefficient of the main explanatory 
variable changes significantly when both child dependency and old age dependency 
ratios are included as opposed to the baseline model where only age dependency ratio is 
considered.  
No previous studies exist that examine the effect of charitable giving on 
government public welfare spending at the state level. The study that comes closest this 
study is that of Garrett and Rhine (2007) who use aggregate time series data for all states 
in the U.S. to study the causal effect of education giving on federal spending on 
education. They find that a dollar increase in charitable giving reduces federal education 
spending by $0.56. Although, the results here are not directly comparable to those of 
Garrett and Rhine (2007), coefficients presented for model (1) in tables 4.3 and 4.4 
(3.76% and 2.2%) indicate that charitable giving crowds out government welfare 
spending much more than it does federal education spending. 
Overall, the empirical findings support the hypothesis that the level of charitable 
contributions in a state significantly affects the proportion of public welfare grants. This 
phenomenon of crowding-out through reallocation of grant funds to different areas 
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supports the idea that private funding of public goods through non-profits relaxes the 
budget constraints faced by state policymakers enabling them to reallocate federal grants 
funds to preferred uses.     
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation focuses on the fiscal relationship between three tiers of 
governments in the United States: federal government, state government and the local 
government. Three independent essays in this dissertation each focus on a different issue 
of interest in public finance: the response of school districts and county governments to 
changes in state government grant allocations; political determinants of presidential 
disaster declarations; and the crowding out of federal transfers to states by private 
charitable donations.   
In the first essay, I test the hypothesis that county governments and school 
districts change property tax levies to counteract the effects of changes in state 
government revenue/grants to local government. My results indicate that there is indeed a 
statistically significant inverse relationship as expected between state government grants 
and property taxes levied by local governments and school districts. Another major result 
from this study is that property taxes, a major funding source for public education, 
decrease when the proportion of the young population increases. This could have 
important consequences for public education funding.  
 The second essay analyzes the political determinants of the time it takes for 
presidents to declare major disasters, paying particular attention to political determinants 
of federal emergency management. The results obtained provide evidence that the 
average number of days for presidential disaster declarations is lower when the president 
is a Republican and the governor is a Democrat, while the longest time delay in 
presidential disaster declarations occurs when the president is a Democrat and the 
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governor is a Republican. Results show that the higher an incumbent president’s vote 
share, the shorter is the delay in presidential disaster declarations. Additionally, I find that 
the more salient the disaster event is (as measured by the number of newspaper articles 
per day), the shorter it takes for presidents to declare major disasters.  
The third essay provides evidence that state-level charitable contributions 
correlate significantly with federal public welfare grants to states. An increase in 
charitable contributions leads to a decrease in the proportion of federal grants allocated 
for public welfare, controlling for political and demographic factors. I also show that the 
level of crowding out that occurs is significantly higher than that predicted by the 
previous literature on the subject. 
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